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USE "THE FILTER YOU WERE BORN WITH":* THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF MANDATORY INTERNET
FILTERING FOR THE ADULT PATRONS OF PUBLIC
LIBRARIES
Richard J. Peltzl
Abstract: The only federal court (at the time of this writing) to consider the question ruled
unconstitutional the mandatory filtering of Internet access for the adult patrons of public
libraries. That 1998 decision helped the American Library Association and other free speech
advocates fend off mandatory filtering for two years at the state and federal level, against the
vigorous efforts of filtering proponents. Then, in 2000, the U.S. Congress conditioned federal
funding of libraries on filter use, forcing the question into the courts as the latest colossal
struggle over Internet regulation. This Article contends that the federal court in 1998 was
right, and the Article counters criticism that has been leveled against that decision since. The
public library is the quintessential venue for citizens to exercise their First Amendment right
to receive information and ideas. As such, the library should be preserved against the
imposition of automated content filters, which are too imprecise, and alternatively value-
laden or arbitrary, to meet exacting constitutional safeguards.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Washington Coalition Against Censorship sells a T-shirt that
leaves little doubt where the organization stands on Internet filtering.
"Use your brain," the shirt says, "[t]he filter you were born with."'
Coalition Executive Director Barbara Dority authored a 1999 article
captioned even more bluntly: "Filtering: Just Another Form of
Censorship."' While intellectual freedom champions such as the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the American Library
Association (ALA) agree, lawmakers across the country do not. Spurring
the latest and hottest battle over expressive freedom on the Internet,
mandatory filtering has become all the rage in lawmaking.3 Leading the
See infra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
t Assistant Professor of Law, William H. Bowen School of Law, University of Arkansas at Little
Rock. The author thanks Professor John MA. DiPippa for reviewing a draft of this Article, and
Jessie Cranford, Bettye Kerns Fowler, Dwain Gordon, Ellen Johnson, Louise Lowe, Melissa Serfass,
and other members of the Arkansas Library Association for their tireless defense of intellectual
freedom. This Article is dedicated to public school librarian Josephine Monson, an inspiration.
1. Barbara Dority, Filtering: Just Another Form of Censorship, HUmANIST, Mar./Apr. 1999, at
39.
2. Id.
3. See infra Part III.A.4.
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charge for mechanical intervention is a 2000 federal law that forces
filters into public libraries and public school libraries nationwide this
year, as a condition of federal funding.
That law, buried in a major appropriations bill,4 combines the
Children's Internet Protection Act5 and the Neighborhood Children's
Internet Protection Act6 (together, CIPA, also known as CHIPA). CIPA
marks Congress's third attempt to regulate the Internet in the name of
child protection, the former two attempts having been stymied by the
courts. The bill containing CIPA passed with a comfortable margin of
support in the last weeks of 2000,' despite strident objections from the
ALA8 and a warning from Congress's own designated research
commission that filters in libraries and schools raise "significant
concerns about First Amendment values."9
Congress was also undeterred by a 1998 federal court decision that
condemned the mandatory filtering of all library computers, for all
library patrons, as unconstitutional." Already challenged in court by the
ACLU, the ALA, and others," CIPA will force the courts to consider the
4. Consolidated Appropriations Act 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
5. Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. D, §§ 1701-1721, 114
Stat. 2763A-336 to -350 (2000); see also infra note 23.
6. Neighborhood Children's Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. D, §§ 1731-
1741, 114 Stat. 2763A-350 to -351 (2000); see infra note 23.
7. The House passed H.R. 4577, 106th Cong. (2000), on December 15, 2000, with 292 for, 60
against, 80 not voting (Republicans 133-51-38, Democrats 157-9-42, independents 2-0-0). 146
CONG. REC. H12,502. The Senate approved H.R. 4577 on the same day without a roll call vote. 146
CONG. REC. Sll,855. Senator Wellstone objected to the omnribus appropriations bill for its
"numerous other pieces of unrelated legislation" and bemoaned the lack of a roll call vote. 146
CONG. REC. 811,876. The President signed CIPA into law on December 21, 2000. Consolidated
Appropriations Act 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, 2763 (2000).
8. American Library Association (ALA) Washington Office, at http://www.ala.org/washoffl-
statements.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002) (linking to twenty statements made to Congress
opposing mandatory filtering legislation); ALA Washington Office, Office of Government
Relations, Issue Brief Librarians Oppose Federal Internet Filtering Mandates (July 2000), at
http://www.ala.orglwashoff/intellectualfreedom.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2002).
9. COMMISSION ON CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION, REPORT TO CONGRESS 20 (Oct. 20, 2000),
available at http://www.copacommission.org/report/COPAreport.pdf (last visited Apr. 30,2002).
10. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 556
& n.2 (E.D. Va. 1998) (Mainstream Loudoun 11).
11. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, No. 01-
CV-1301 (E.D. Penn. 2001), available at http'//www.ala.org/cipa/cipacomplaint.pdf (last visited
Apr. 30, 2002) [hereinafter ALA Compl.]; Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
Multnomah County Pub. Library v. United States, No. 01-CV-1322 (E.D. Penn. 2001), available at
http://www.aclu.org/court/multnomah.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2002) [hereinafter Multnomah
Compl.].
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First Amendment role of libraries in American society. That issue has
troubled judges, scholars, and librarians since a fractured Supreme Court
ruling in 198212 created as many questions about library law as it
answered."3
A California court recognized that public libraries are in a "damned if
you do, damned if you don't" position regarding Internet filters, 4
because a library might be sued for filtering or for not filtering. In fact,
libraries have already faced suits for their decisions on filtering Internet
access. The ACLU successfully sued a library in Loudoun County,
Virginia, for restricting patrons to filtered access.' Meanwhile, a patron
in Livermore, California, sued (unsuccessfully) a library for not filtering
her son's access. 6 Librarians in Minneapolis filed a sexual harassment
claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
over unfiltered access there. 7 The California court dismissed the
Livermore suit, 8 but the EEOC ruled preliminarily in favor of the
Minneapolis complainants.' Furthermore, libraries struggling with
12. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 855, 875, 878, 883,
885 (1982).
13. Though CIPA concerns minors' rights in the library, as well as adults' rights, neither the
ALA nor the ACLU has challenged CIPA's application to public school libraries. Jenner & Block,
CIPA Frequently Asked Question #3, CIPA and School Libraries, at http://www.ala.org/cipa/
cipafaq3.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002); see Multnomah Compl., supra note 11, at 2-4. Because
minors' rights and school law raise legal issues that muddy the CIPA question, the ACLU has
decided to pursue first only the more straightforward public library case. Interview with Chris
Hansen, National ACLU attorney, in Minneapolis, Minn. (Aug. 8, 2001).
The prospect of raising the school law question both excites and frightens student-rights activists,
who have witnessed a steady decline in minors' constitutional entitlements in the fading glow of the
civil rights era. See, eg., Richard J. Peltz, Censorship Tsunami Spares College Media: To Protect
Free Expression on Public Campuses, Lessons from the "College Hazelwood" Case, 68 TENN. L
REV. 481, 495-500 (2001). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First
Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates: What's Left of Tinker?, 28 DRAKE L REv. 527
(2000); Nadine Strossen, Keeping the Constitution Inside the Schoolhouse Gate: Students' Rights
Thirty Years After Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 48 DRAKE L
REV. 445 (2000).
14. Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772,776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
15. Mainstream Loudoun 1, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552.
16. Kathleen R., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 772. See generally Junichi P. Semitsu, Note, Burning
Cyberbooks in Public Libraries: Internet Filtering Software vs. The First Amendment, 52 STAN. L
REV. 509, 521-24 (2000).
17. See generally, eg., Carl S. Kaplan, Cyber Law Journal: Controversial Ruling on Library
Filters, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2001 (on file with author).
18. Kathleen R., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 784.
19. See generally Kaplan, supra note 17. See generally Kim Houghton, Note, Internet
Pornography in the Library: Can the Public Library Employer Be Liable for Third-Party Sexual
Harassment When a Client Displays Internet Pornography to Staff., 65 BROOK. L REv. 827
(1999). The National Law Center for Children and Families (NLC) uses the threat of such
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filtering face local community groups forming picket lines, 20 national
organizations prepared to fund trench political warfare,2 board members
and state legislators who want to look like they are doing something
about "the problem, '22 and now a bipartisan federal mandate that usurps
local control.'
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate the unconstitutionality
of mandatory Internet filtering for adult patrons of the public library.
This proposition is not original, but merits further development amid the
continuing tug of war between filtering proponents and opponents.
Part II describes the technology of Internet filtering, establishing a
vocabulary with which to address the legal problems and studying the
efficacy of filtering. Part II[ describes the current law, state and federal,
statutory and judicial, pertinent to Internet filtering, including pending
litigation. Part IV argues that the 1998 federal decision against
mandatory filtering was correctly decided, exploring scholarly criticism
and dispelling a common misperception of the court's reasoning. Part IV
complaints, as well as of criminal prosecution, to press libraries to filter. See NLC, NLC
MEMORANDUM OF LAW ON LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING THE USE OF FILTERING SOFTWARE BY
LIBRARIES, SCHOOLS, AND BUSINESSES 20, 32-42, 56 (1999) [hereinafter NLC LEGAL
MEMORANDUM], previously at http://www.nationallawcenter.org/NLC%20Filter /20Memo%-
2097% 20final%20v-cover.pdf (last visited July 20, 2001) ("[U]se of a program filter may be the
best or only way to avoid liability."). The NLC goes so far as to suggest that a library that filters
might have grounds to pursue Rule 11 sanctions and even a malicious prosecution countersuit
against a § 1983 plaintiff who would "[use] the Civil Rights Act ... for a wrongful collateral
purpose." Id. at 21. It is unclear from the NLC Legal Memorandum what would constitute "a
wrongful collateral purpose."
20. E.g., Wayne Risher, Library To Block Porn on Computers Open to Public, [MEMPHIS] COM.
APPEAL, Sept. 24, 1999, at Al, available at 1999 WL 22126601 (reporting that "300 placard-
waving citizens rallied against pornography outside the Main Library," prompting the Memphis
library board to mandate filtering unanimously).
21. E.g., Lisa Singhania, City To Vote on Net Filters at Library, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE,
Feb. 20, 2000, at 5A (quoting Holland, Michigan's conservative mayor referring to the "American
Family Association's commando tactics").
22. E.g., Harvey Rice, Free Speech Tangled in the Web: Montgomery County Orders its
Libraries To Block Internet Access to Porn Sites, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 19, 2000, at 37,
available at 2000 WL 4286949 (quoting library director, who stated, "I feel like Swiss cheese,"
after a "public chastisement" by county commissioners for "allowing access to Intemet
pornography").
23. CIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1 (a)(4), 114 Stat. 2763, 2763 (2000). On the day of its passage
in Congress, CIPA was copied into §§ 1701-1741 of H.R. 5666, 106th Cong. (2000), which in turn
was added as Appendix D, including CIPA, §§ 1701-1741, 114 Stat. 2763A-336 to -351, to H.R.
4577, 106th Cong. (2000), the final omnibus budget bill. CIPA's provisions were enacted at 20
U.S.C.A. § 9134 (2000) and 47 U.S.C.A. § 254 (Supp. 2001). For ease of reference, subsequent
citations to CIPA will refer to §§ 1701-1741, which appear in Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763A-336 to -351 (2000).
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leads to the conclusion that CIPA is, or at least should be, an
impermissible infringement on the constitutional rights of the adult
patrons of public libraries.
1I. THE TECHNOLOGY AND EFFICACY OF INTERNET
FILTERING
A. Technology: What Filters Are and How They Work
To understand the law regarding Internet filtering, one first must have
a vocabulary for filtering technology and understand something of how
filters work. Just as courts struggle to analogize the Internet to familiar
media such as speech, print, and broadcast, judges and scholars
invariably analogize Internet filtering to conventional restrictions on
information flow-whether a parent's educational choices or a
librarian's collection management. Familiarity with filtering technology
facilitates understanding and analogical analysis of the pertinent law.
Derisively called censorware by opponents,24 Internet filters restrict
access by individual computer users to the Internet.2 A personal
computer owner may purchase a filtering software package in a retail
market or over the Internet, then run that package on a single computer
with Internet access. 26 A filter may also run on a server computer, which
intervenes between users and the Internet.27 For constitutional purposes,
24. See, e.g., Censorware Home Page, at http:/www.censorware.net (last visited Apr. 30, 2002);
ELECTRONIC PRIVAcY INFORMATION CENTER, CENSORvARE: A PosT-CDA SoLuTIoN?, at http://-
vAv.epi.orgfiee..speech/censorvare (last visited Apr. 30,2002).
25. E.g., ACLU, CENSORSHIP IN A Box, at http:ll (last visited Apr. 30,2002); ALA, LBRARIEs &
THE INTERNET TOOLKIT 14, at http'/www.ala.orglalaorgloif/intemettoolkit.pdf (last visited Apr. 30,
2002); FILTERING FACTS, HOw FILTERS REALLY WORK, previously at http://wwwv.filteringfacts.org-
hovfilt.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 1999) [hereinafter FILTERING FATS] (on file with author); see
also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 854-55 (1997) (referring to "[s]ystems ... to help parents
control the material that may be available on a home corputer with Internet access"). See generally
Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 629,
652-55 (1998); Sernitsu, supra note 16, at 513-16. For a concise description of the origin, nature,
and workings of the Internet, see Reno, 521 U.S. at 849-52, and In re Doubleclick Inc. Privacy
Litig., No. 00-CIV-0641-NRB, 2001 wVL 303744, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2001) (describing the
Internet).
26. Whitney Kaiser, The Use of Internet Filters in Public Schools: Double Click on the
Constitution, 34 COLUM. 3.L & Soc. PROBS. 49, 52 (2000); see also, eg., SURFCONTROL, HOME
PRODUCTS, at http://wvw.surfcontrol.com/homelproducts/ (last visited Apr. 30,2002).
27. E.g., COMMISSION ON CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION, supra note 9, at 19-21; Geoffrey
Nunberg, The Internet Filter Farce: Why Blocking Software Doesn't-and Can't-Work as
Washington Law Review
there is no significant distinction between a filter running on a single
computer and a filter running on a proxy server. The filtering software
that runs on each operates in the same fundamental fashion, though there
might be differences between systems or products in how much control
librarians can exercise over filter settings.28
Filters operate either on a black-list principle or a white-list principle.
Black-list filters, also called blocking filters, presume that the user is
entitled to full access to the Internet, but revoke that access when the
user seeks content on the "black list," that is, content that matches the
filter's blocking criteria. White-list filters work inversely. They presume
that a user has access to none of the Internet, then affirmatively grant the
user access to content on the "white list," or "allow list. '29 White-list
filtering has tempted librarians as a solution to legal woes, but the
solution is deceptively simple and severely curtails the resources
available to patrons. Naturally, a white-list filter is much more precise
than a black-list filter in restricting a computer user to specified content.
However, because Internet content is constantly growing and changing, a
black list allows access to a vastly broader bank of content than a white
list possibly could.3"
In today's libraries, white-list filters are best suited for the children's
31 32section, or for open-access computers dedicated to specific purposes.
For example, a children's section computer can be dedicated to use by
young children by installing a white-list filter that allows children access
to specified educational games. In this way, young children can play on
the Internet and become familiar with using computer controls, without
being overwhelmed by jargon and subject matter beyond their
comprehension. At the same time, a computer in an open access area can
be dedicated to a specific use by installing an appropriate white-list
filter. Libraries have long used white-list systems on open access
Promised, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2001, at 28, 30; see also, e.g., AM. ONLINE, PARENTAL
CONTROLS, at http://www.aol.com/info/parentcontrol.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002).
28. See, e.g., David Bruce, Filtering the Internet for Young People: Products and Problems,
TCHR. LIBR., May/June 1999, at 13.
29. E.g., FILTERING FACTS, supra note 25; Kaiser, supra note 26, at 54.
30. See FILTERING FACTS, supra note 25; Kaiser, supra note 26, at 54.
31. FILTERING FACTS, supra note 25.
32. E.g., Mark Nadel, The First Amendment's Limitations on the Use of Internet Filtering in
Public and School Libraries: What Content Can Libraries Exclude?, 78 TEX. L REV. 1117, 1136
(2000) (suggesting a white-list filter to restrict a library terminal for patron access to recent federal
court decisions posted on the Internet).
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computers without Internet access-for example, a filter that restricts an
ordinary computer to access only the library's catalog, or only the
InfoTrac periodical database. Such resources now typically "reside" at
the library via the Internet.
These uses of white-list filters raise no censorship concerns because
they are selection decisions of the kind librarians make routinely.33 At
least one private company has set out to create an expansive white-list
filter for adult patrons in public libraries, called "The Library
Channel."'3 The formidable task requires systematic evaluation of web
pages in a human selection process like that which librarians currently
apply to books. The size and protean nature of the Internet make the task
almost impracticable. By November 1999, 112 participating libraries had
cataloged 26,000 sites:35 impressive, but futile against the backdrop of
hundreds of millions of web pages.
While white-list filters give rise to little more legal wrangling than the
traditional library selection process, black-list filters are another matter.
The black-list filter signifies affirmative exclusion, some say removal, of
content from the library collection.36 Thus, when referring to filtering in
subsequent parts, this Article means black-list filtering, unless specified
otherwise.
Besides the distinction between black-list and white-list filters, filters
may operate either based on content or based on protocol.37
Understanding protocol distinctions is important, because the legitimate
power of librarians to restrict protocol access is easily but mistakenly
confused with unconstitutional content-based restriction. The Internet
offers various protocols, or media of communication. Well-known
protocols include the World Wide Web, electronic mail, newsgroups,
33. See infra Part V.E.
34. See, e-g., Nadel, supra note 32, at 1136; see also Mary Minow, Filters and the Public
Library: A Legal and Policy Analysis, FIRST MONDAY (1997), at http.//www.firstmonday.dk/-
issues/issue2_12/minow/index.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2002) (discussing the Library Channel as a
selection device); Semitsu, supra note 16, at 541-42.
35. Nadel, supra note 32, at 1136. According to Nadel, the Columbus Public Library in 2000 had
a white list of some 30,000 websites. Id.
36. "[In a limited public forum library,] filtering is reactive rather than proactive, designed to
prevent access to certain information rather than assisting in its use." Jeannette Allis Bastian,
Filtering the Internet in American Public Libraries: Sliding Down the Slippery Slope, FIRST
MONDAY (1997), at http:lvwv.firstmonday.dklissues/issue2_lO/basfian/index.html (last visited
Apr. 30,2002).
37. See, eg., id.; FILTERING FACTS, supra note 25; Kaiser, supra note 26, at 54; see also Minow,
supra note 34.
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and chat. 8 Protocol blocking does not usually pose a legal concern,
because the decision to block a protocol is unrelated to the content of the
communication. Rather, a library typically blocks a protocol, such as e-
mail or chat, so that computer resources can be dedicated to research
rather than communication.39 This dedication is again akin to the pre-
Internet reservation of a computer for a specified purpose, such as a
computer dedicated to periodical searches rather than programming or
calculating. Chat can be analogized to a town hall meeting, which a
library need not host, but may. If a library does allow computers to be
used for chat, then First Amendment protections against content and
viewpoint discrimination are triggered the same as they would be for a
town hall meeting. Hence, when referring to filtering in subsequent
parts, this Article means content-based filtering-and usually, content
filtering of the World Wide Web-when not specified otherwise.
A black-list content filter employs one or more methods of filtering,
or blocking, including: site blocking, word blocking, and rating
blocking. All three raise constitutional issues.
Site blocking involves filtering websites according their specific
identities or addresses.4" Site blocking is the least overinclusive method
of filtering because blocked sites are selected individually by human
reviewers.4 However, site blocking suffers flaws similar to white-list
filtering. The size of the Internet makes human assessment of every
website impossible, and the protean nature of the Internet can quickly
outdate a site-blocking decision.42 Of legal significance, site-blocking
decisions for commercial software are made in the first instance by
38. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851-53 (1997).
39. A library might legitimately block file transfer protocols for fear of exposing the system to a
computer virus.
40. E.g., ACLU, CENSORSHIP IN A BOX, supra note 25; Bastian, supra note 36; FILTERING
FACTS, supra note 25; Kaiser, supra note 26, at 53; see also Minow, supra note 34 (describing both
site and host blocking as "host blocking").
41. See FILTERING FACTS, supra note 25; Minow, supra note 34. Professor Minow compares site
review with "the early history of motion picture review when censors watched reels of film, to make
sure enamored couples always kept one foot on the floor." Minow, supra note 34.
42. E.g., Kaiser, supra note 26, at 53. Professor Minow recounts a campus joke at Stanford
University, where students labored to develop SurfWatch's original site blocking list. See Minow,
supra note 34. Students "refer[red] to the filtering industry as the full employment act for Stanford
students-while some screen out objectionable sites, the rest create and relocate them." Id.
Vol. 77:397, 2002
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employees of the commercial vendors, not by public librarians.43 A
vendor guards its list of blocked sites as a secret, proprietary product of
labor-intensive investment.' Flexible filtering software typically permits
a system administrator to unblock desired sites or to augment the list of
blocked sites.4"
Related to site blocking, host blocking is a prophylactic variation in
which all of the websites published by a particular host are blocked after
one web page or website from that host is identified for blocking.46
Naturally, host blocking lacks the "less overinclusive" appeal of site
blocking, and has drawn fire for casting such a wide net. For instance,
one Oregon Republican reversed his formerly pro-filtering stance when
his campaign site was blocked; software provider Surfwatch declared
him a victim of his web host, which featured some sites with
pornographic content.47
Word blocking, also called keyword blocking, essentially looks for
objectionable words and blocks websites that contain those words." As
an example, a word-blocking filter might block references to "sex" or
"breast."49 In fact, word-blocking filters are more sophisticated. Using
proprietary, secret formulas, filters take account of context by, for
43. See Bastian, supra note 36 (citing KAREN SCHNEIDER, TIFAP: THE INTERNET FILTER
ASSESSMENT PROJECT SUMhmARY REPORT, PHASE 2, at www.bluehighways.com/tifap/allreports.html
(last visited Apr. 30, 2002)).
44. E.g., Kaiser, supra note 26, at 54. Of course, clever users can reverse engineer a filter's block
list. The tools and fruits of such efforts have been suppressed by copyright law. E.g., Microsystems
Software, Inc. v. Scandinavia Online AB, 98 F. Supp. 2d 74, 74-75 (D. Mass. 2000); Nunberg,
supra note 27, at 29 (citation omitted). See generally CyberPatrol Lawsuit Archive, at http://-
www.politechbot.com/cyberpatrol (last visited Apr. 30, 2002). Nunberg asserts that secrecy is less
about protecting intellectual property than about preventing the public from "rapidly see[ing] just
how inadequate the[] software is." Nunberg, supra note 27, at 30-31. Indeed, one reason why filters
perform so badly is that the software makers' ability to keep their performance a secret has up to
now exempted them from the competitive pressures that would ordinarily force them to bring their
products up to the level of other kinds of language software. Id. at 33. But not all filters keep their
lists secret, and not all are in it for the money. For example, NetNanny makes its list public. Digital
Chaperones for Kids, CONSLMER REP., Mar. 2001, at 22. Likewise, the Library Channel white list
is not secret. Nadel, supra note 32, at 1151.
45. See, e.g., Bruce, supra note 28, at 13.
46. See Bastian, supra note 36.
47. John Schwartz, Internet Filters Used to Shield Minors Censor Speech, Critics Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2001, available at 2001 WL 17362447 (discussing "pollock4congress.com") (on
file with author). "What he once thought of as protection, he said, now looked a lot like censorship."
Id.
48. E.g., ACLU, CENSORSHIP IN A BOX, supra note 25; Bastian, supra note 36; FILTERING
FACTS, supra note 25; Kaiser, supra note 26, at 53.
49. See Minow, supra note 34 (referring to keyword blocking as "a shotgun approach").
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example, checking how many times the word "sex" appears and whether
it appears in the vicinity of other suspect words." Thus, the filter should
be able to distinguish between a website about tourist attractions in
"Essex," or about "breast cancer," and sites with pornographic content.
In practice, however, these distinctions often elude automated filters,
revealing word blocking's fatal flaw and providing fodder for filtering
opponents." One renowned error occurred when filters blocked the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Mars Explorer site;
the web address omitted the space in "marsexplorer."52 Filtering Facts, a
now-defunct organization that once led the charge for Internet filtering
in public libraries, stated as early as 1999 that word blocking "must be
turned off in a library setting. '53 A scholar more recently noted that word
blocking has "fallen out of favor." 4 However, word blocking is still
employed, at a minimum to locate sites for human site-blocking review,55
and perhaps to shore up thin site-block lists.56
Besides the inherent limitation in a computer's ability to assess
context as thoroughly as a human being, a serious limitation on word-
blocking filters is their inability to evaluate images; thus, a website
consisting of no words but only objectionable photographs or other
graphics would escape detection by a word-blocking filter. Software
makers once trumpeted a filter that could analyze images, but it proved
50. This methodology is sometimes called "fuzzy logic." E.g., Nadel, supra note 32, at 1120; cf.
Bruce L Plopper & Lauralee McCool, The Impact of Fuzzy Logic on Student Press Law,
JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. EDUCATOR, Winter 2001, at 4 (adapting the mathematical theory of
fuzzy logic to examine First Amendment case law).
51. E.g., Minow, supra note 34 ("In fact, the English language bursts with words and phrases
with double and triple meanings, supplying the country's comics with endless double entendre
material for their nightly performances.").
52. Mike Martindale, Internet Smut Law Disturbs Librarians: Designed To Protect Children,
Measure Blocks Access to Legitimate Data, Too, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 5, 2000 (on file with
author). In a similar vein, Los Angeles law firm librarian Bob Ryan found SmartFilter blocking the
innocent site Animals Exotic and Small. Posting of Robert S. Ryan, Rryan@HFBLLP.COM, to law-
lib@ucdavis.edu (last visited Apr. 28, 2000) (on file with author). Ryan observed that "apparently
[SmartFilter] doesn't think I should be accessing a site about AnimalSex, otic or small." Id.
53. FILTERING FACTS, supra note 25.
54. Kaiser, supra note 26, at 53.
55. E.g., Bastian, supra note 36; Jonathan D. Wallace, Purchase of Blocking Software by Public
Libraries Is Unconstitutional (1997), at http://www.spectacle.org/cs/library.html (last visited Apr.
30,2002).
56. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 34 (describing filters as "an amalgamation of keyword and site
blocking"); Nunberg, supra note 27, at 30-32 (asserting that filter developers could not possibly use
site blocking alone to review a useful fraction of web content).
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ineffective in practice. 7 Instructing a computer to analyze color and
shade to distinguish an underarm from genitalia has proven no small
feat; instructing a computer to distinguish an artist's nude from a
pornographer's nude might be impossible. 8
Rating blocking restricts access to websites based on the sites'
ratings, that is, ratings in the same sense as "PG" and "R" are ratings for
movies. 9 Ratings have promise as a mechanism to aid parents in
selecting web content for their children, just as the voluntary ratings on
movies and television programs have provided parents with additional
guidance in selecting programming for their children." The dominant
standard for Internet rating is provided by the Platform for Internet
Content Selection (PICS), developed by AT&T and Massachusetts
Institute of Technology researchers. PICS provides "little more than the
syntax and protocols used" in rating and is intended to serve as "the
underlying standard" for any number of "third-party rating systems."'"
'By far the largest [such system] is sponsored by the Recreational
Software Advisory Council on the Internet," which "comes pre-installed
in all versions of Microsoft's Internet Explorer."6
Filtering through ratings seriously threatens to "flatten speech on the
Net, disproportionately excluding speech that was not created by
commercial providers for a mass audience."'6 Requiring Internet content
authors to rate their own content according to a uniform scheme raises
an insurmountable problem of unconstitutionally-compelled speech.'
57. See Nunberg, supra note 27, at 32 ("In 1999 Exotrope, a company in Elmira, New York,
introduced a system called BAIR (for Basic Artificial Intelligence Routine), which it billed as
capable of recognizing pornographic images with 99 percent accuracy, thanks to its use of artificial
intelligence and 'active information matrices.").
58. See id. ("In the end, BAIR is just a system that can identify flesh tones with less than 70
percent accuracy-about par for the present state of image recognition, and miles short of a system
that could reliably tell the difference between stills from Deep Throat and from My Dinner with
Andri.!).
59. See, eg., Minow, supra note 34. See generally Semitsu, supra note 16, at 516-19.
60. See generally Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453
(1997), available at http/-vww.law:.wayne.edu/weinberg/rating.htm, cited in Minow, supra note
34.
61. R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 MINN. L REv. 755, 764, 767 (1999).
See generally id. at 760-71 (explaining Internet rating and especially detailing PICS).
62. Id. at 767-68. The White House has supported building PICS into web browsers. Minow,
supra note 34.
63. Weinberg, supra note 60, at 482.
64. E.g., Minow, supra note 34 ("Major news organizations... have gone on record stating that
they would rather 'go dark' than self-rate their news stories for sex and violence."); c. Hearing on
National Independent Council for Entertainment in Video Devices Act of 1993 Before Senate
Washington Law Review
Furthermore, any government enforcement of a rating mechanism would
surely fail for the same reasons government cannot institutionalize a
motion picture rating system.65 Alternatively, the rating of every website
by some third party is no different from site blocking, raising the same
mechanical and legal issues. Rating further poses the same problems that
slowed its adoption in television, such as the perennial question of "what
is news?" (News and sports programs on television carry no ratings. 66)
On the Internet, the problem is compounded, as The New York Times on
the Web 6 7-the electronic outlet for the staunchly traditional and highly
regarded newspaper of record-stands on equal footing with
RumorsRumorsRumors, a web publication touting the latest in celebrity
gossip and conspiracy theories."
An Internet filter of acceptable quality typically offers a flexible
combination of the mechanisms and methods described here, ready to be
customized by a system administrator. For example, CyberPatrol, in the
SurfControl family of products,69 is a market leader in home Internet
filters.70 A parent who purchases CyberPatrol can install the software on
his or her home computer and becomes the system administrator.7 The
Government Affairs Committee, Dec. 9, 1993, available at 1993 WL 664384 (testimony of Robert
S. Peck, ACLU, asserting unconstitutionality of mandatory video game self-rating). While the
problem of compelled speech strongly indicates that mandatory self-rating is unconstitutional, other
arguments point to the same conclusion. See Wagner, supra note 61, at 779-801; see also Lessig,
supra note 25, at 658-65 (explaining PICS's incompatibility with free expression). But see Wagner,
supra note 61, at 777-812 (discussing numerous strategies by which the government might act
indirectly to achieve mandatory self-rating without running afoul of the First Amendment); J.M.
Balkin et al., Filtering the Internet: A Best Practices Model (1999) (outlining a rating system
purportedly sensitive to civil liberties issue), previously at http://infosociety.law.yale.edu/-
Filtering5.rtf (last visited July 19, 2001).
65. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502-06 (1952) (holding unconstitutional
state licensing scheme for motion pictures); Motion Picture Ass'n of Am. v. Specter, 315 F. Supp.
824, 826 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (rejecting as unconstitutionally vague state adoption of motion picture
rating system into criminal film exhibition law).
66. In re Implementation of Section 551 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 13 FCC Rec.
8232, paras. 7, 21, available at 1998 WL 110188.
67. The New York Times on the Web Home Page, at http://www.nytimes.com/ (last visited Apr.
30,2002).
68. RumorsRumorsRumors Home Page, at http://www.rumorsrumorsrumors.com/ (last visited
Apr. 30,2002).
69. SURFCONTROL, PRODUCT OVERVIEW, at http://www.surfcontrol.comfhomelproducts/
cyber patrol-web.asp (last visited Apr. 30, 2002).
70. See, e.g., Bastian, supra note 36.
71. The following explication documents the author's personal experience with CyberPatrol
version 4.0, except where indicated.
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administrator has access to the CyberPatrol "Headquarters" screen,
where filtering criteria may be customized. In this password-protected
area, an administrator can restrict user access to the Internet by time,
protocol, and content. By time, the administrator can restrict the user to
certain hours or a number of hours of the day or week. The administrator
can restrict access to protocols: chat, the web, file transfers, newsgroups,
games, and applications. And simply by checking a box, the
administrator can restrict access on a content basis according to any of
twelve categories, or combination thereof: "violence/profanity," "partial
nudity, .... full nudity," "sexual acts/text," "gross depictions/text,"
"intolerance," "satanic or cult," "drugs/drug culture,"
"militant/extremist, .. .. sex education," "questionable/illegal &
gambling," and "alcohol & tobacco." When a user attempts to access
prohibited content, CyberPatrol presents a "Checkpoint" screen, and the
content is blocked. To control access according to its content
classification scheme, CyberPatrol uses its proprietary "CyberNOT" list,
a site-blocking tool. The latest home version of CyberPatrol offers
keyword filtering as an option that may be turned off.72
An example of a network filter is Bess, a product of N2H2,73
employed by, among many clients,74 the State of Arkansas Department
of Information Services (Arkansas DIS).75 By spring 2001, Arkansas DIS
had made Bess available to the state's 310 school districts, and 297 had
adopted it.76 The state has since passed legislation that resembles the
72. SURFCONTROL, CYBERPATROL FOR HOME, at http'/ww.surfcontrol.com/homelproducts/
cyber_.patrol-web.asp (last visited Apr. 30, 2002). This feature was not available when I tested the
product.
73. N2H2, ALL PRODUCTS, previously at http-//wv.n2h2.comi/solutions/allproducts.html (last
visited July 20, 2001).
74. Thanks to CIPA, N2H2's business is booming; Bess provides filtering for 16.5 million school
children. Marketplace Morning Report (National Public Radio broadcast, Jan. 25, 2002), transcript
available at 2002 WVL 4428769. Filtering companies also have growing markets in the corporate
world, where executives want to restrict or monitor employees' surfing habits, and in foreign
countries, such as Saudi Arabia, where the government is not as deferential to individual liberty as
the United States. John Carroll, Block That Slacker: Snooping on the Excessive Internet Habits of
Corporate Employees Grows Big Market for Site-Filtering Software, SOUTHWEST AIRLINES SPIRIT,
Oct. 2001, at 34; Jennifer Lee, Companies Compete To Provide Saudi Internet Veil, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 2001 (on file vith author).
75. RAYMOND SmiON, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIRECTOR'S COMMUNICATION,
MEMORANDUM No. DIR-00-012 (Sept. 22, 1999), available at http:/larkedu. state.ar.us/dirmemos/
static/fy9900/44l.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002).
76. Hearing on H.B. 1003 Before Ark. Senate Tech. Comm., Feb. 6, 2001 (testimony of Drew
Mashbum, Arkansas Department of Information Systems, as witnessed by author) [hereinafter
Mashbum Testimony].
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CIPA, though lacking any hinge on government funding and pertaining
only to public school libraries, pursuant to pending state regulations.77
Under Arkansas DIS's arrangement with N2H2, Bess should block only
material that is obscene or harmful to minors.7" Arkansas users who find
sites improperly blocked or improperly available may submit them to
N2H2 for reconsideration. 79 For its part, N2112-with seventy-five
employees and eight million blocked sites -- has told Arkansas DIS that
Bess blocks only upon human review."1 Though Arkansas DIS is a public
agency subject to Arkansas's strong public records law, 2 its agreement
with N2H2 does not require the company to release its block list, and
N2H2 has specifically declined to do so.83
B. Efficacy: What Filters Are Not and When They Don't Work
If the raison d'etre of the Internet filter is to stop users from seeing
sexual content that the law forbids them to see, then filters have failed to
fulfill their purpose. Not only are they incapable of applying peculiarly
human legal definitions in content analysis, they are too easily
circumvented by intelligent, determined users and content providers.
Filters can be an effective aid for well-meaning parents who understand
the advantages and limitations of the technology, but filters are no more
law enforcement tools than filter makers are police. Even filter vendor
SurfControl opposed legislative imposition of filtering in public
libraries. 4
77. 2001 Ark. H.B. 1003 (codified at ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 6-21-111, 13-2-104(a) (Michie Supp.
2001)).
78. Mashbum Testimony, supra note 76.
79. ARK. DIS, INTERNET CONTENT FILTERING FAQ, at http:/lvww.dis.state.ar.us/proj%-
5Ffiltering/faq.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2002).
80. Hearing Before Senate Commerce Comm., May 20, 1999, available at 1999 WL 321652
(testimony of Peter Nickerson, N2H2).
81. Mashbum Testimony, supra note 76.
82. See City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 801 S.W.2d 275, 277-80 (Ark. 1990) (allowing
newspaper access to litigation file in hands of private law firm retained by city, despite attorney-
client privilege).
83. E-mail from Drew Mashburn, Arkansas DIS, to the author (Feb. 23, 2001, 4:23 p.m. CST)
(forwarding e-mail from "Kelly" at N2H2, to Rick Martin of the Arkansas Department of Education
(Feb. 23, 2001 11:10 a.m. PST)) (on file with author).
84. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 47 (quoting SurfControl's Susan Getgood as stating, "'[w]e
make software, not policy"'). However, SurfControl's opposition has not kept it from marketing
"CyberPatrol for Education" and offering a free package called .'Town Meeting in a Box' public
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In 1999 and 2000, this author conducted an unscientific test of
CyberPatrol in anticipation of presentations to the Arkansas Library
Association." I used Excite.com, a popular search engine, and searched
for "full nudity sexual acts text." In 1999, I attempted to access the first
ten sites generated by that search. With CyberPatrol turned off, I was
able to access hardcore pornography on all ten sites within two mouse
clicks of my search results. Then I turned CyberPatrol on and set it to
block "full nudity" and "sexual acts/text." The filter blocked eight of the
ten sites, or their links, in time to stop me from seeing pornography. In
2000, I ran the same test and again sought to examine the top ten sites
retrieved by my search. This time, the first three retrieved links took me
to the same gambling site with no nudity or sexual content at all; the
site's "metatext"-encoded keywords not part of the ordinary visual
display-was loaded with sexual terms to lure surfers with prurient
interests. The following ten links-search retrievals four through
thirteen-again provided hardcore pornography within two mouse clicks
of my search results. To CyberPatrol's credit, it correctly allowed the
gambling site as not containing anything to which I objected. As for the
following ten links to hardcore pornography, CyberPatrol again stopped
me from perusing eight of the ten.
Those unscientific results-about an eighty percent success rate for
the filter, or a twenty percent success rate for the ill-intentioned user-
are not far off the best numbers in filter performance according to other
studies. The ALA claims that filters on average successfully block
objectionable sites about eighty percent of the time. 6 In a Consumer
Reports test, SurfWatch performed the best of the tested filters with an
eighty-two percent success rate at blocking sites investigators deemed
inappropriate for minors.87 CyberSitter was successful sixty-three
percent of the time, while NetNanny failed to block any of the sites rated
inappropriate." These numbers reveal software makers' claims, which
typically run in the ninety-percent range, to be "wildly exaggerated,"
says Geoffrey Nunberg, Xerox scientist and consulting professor of
hearing survival kit' to show librarians and educators how CyberPatrol can aid in CIPA compliance.
SURFCONTROL, CYBERPATROL FOR EDUCATION: PRODUCT OVERVIEW, at http:/lwww.
surfcontrol.com/products/cyberpatroLforreducation/product overview/index.htm (last visited Apr.
30,2002); SURFCONTROL, CYBERPATROL FOR EDUCATION: SPECIAL OFFERS (on file with author).
85. Data on file with the author.
86. See ALA, LIBRARIES &THE INTERNET TOOLKIT, supra note 25, at 2.
87. Nunberg, supra note 27.
88. Id.
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linguistics at Stanford University." On the one hand, a blocking success
rate of about eighty percent means that a filter will stop a child user from
accessing a pornographic website four out of five times. On the other
hand, a determined child need try to access pornography only five times
to succeed once.
Filters also improperly block otherwise acceptable sites. One study
found that of 1000 random websites in the dot-coin domain, SurfWatch
mistakenly blocked more than four out of five as "sexually explicit,"
including a limousine service, an antiques dealer, and a storage
company.9" Peacefire, a filtering opponent,9  has claimed that
CyberPatrol mistakenly blocked sites about a third of the time,
perceiving sexual content in the home pages of a lawyer and a home
inspection service.9' A Peacefire study of filter I-Gear found a three-in-
four misclassification rate of the first fifty websites in the dot-edu
domain, including, ironically, a Latin passage from Saint Augustine "in
which the bishop chastises himself for his impure thoughts. 93
Censorware studied SmartFilter, software used in Utah public schools to
block "sex, gambling, criminal skills, hate speech, and drugs"; 94 the filter
detected those elements amid a distinguished reading list that included
"the Declaration of Independence, the United States Constitution, the
Bible, the Book of Mormon, [and] the Koran."9'
Anecdotal evidence has done more than science to subject filters to
public humiliation-such as when the Chicago Public Library
89. Id.
90. Id. at 30.
91. See Peacefire Home Page, at http://www.peacefire.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2002); see also
David Kushner, Fired Up, PLAYBOY.COM (June 26, 2001), at http://www.5.playboy.corm/digitaY
dotcomment/peacefire (no longer at this address; on file with author) (interviewing Peacefire
founder Bennett Haselton).
92. D. Ian Hopper, Internet Filtering Plan Hits Snag, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 23, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 28614922.
93. Nunberg, supra note 27, at 30-31. Nunberg suggests that the Latin preposition "cum"
triggered the filter. Id. at 31.
94. Adam Horowitz, The Constitutionality of the Children's Internet Protection Act, 13 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 425, 433 (2000) (citing Glen Warchol, Report Says Internet Filter Used in Utah
Schools Is a Prude: Internet Filter Used in Schools Blocked the Bible, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 23,
1999, at Al, available at 1999 WL 3352942).
95. Id. (citing CENSORWARE, CENSORED INTERNET ACCESS IN UTAH PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND
LIBRARIES (1999), previously at http://censorware.net/reports/utal/main.html (last visited July 20,
2001)).
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discovered its own site blocked by the library's filter.96 No discussion of
filtering efficacy can be complete without the re-telling of how, in a
"pleasing irony," CyberPatrol blocked the website of the American
Family Association (the AFA), a leading filtering proponent.97 The AFA
website98 drew a block under CyberPatrol's category restriction for
"intolerance," because of the AFA's anti-homosexual rhetoric.99 The
AFA appealed to CyberPatrol's review committee,"'0 asserting a Biblical
basis for the AFA's position, to no avail.' ' The Gay and Lesbian
Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD) invited the AFA to partner in
GLAAD's fight against Internet censorship, but the AFA declined.12
If filters such as Bess and CyberPatrol claim to have subjected all
blocked sites to human review, how does over-inclusive blocking occur?
CyberPatrol's blocking of the AFA site based upon intolerance is
understandable as a difference of opinion. We can give CyberPatrol the
benefit of the doubt and say that it had not yet made keyword filtering an
option to turn off when it blocked Explore Underwater magazine, the
MIT Project on Mathematics and Computation, and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers Construction Engineering Research Laboratories.
0 3
But did a Bess human reviewer decide to block Mother Jones magazine,
the Institute of Australasian Psychiatrists, and the Eustis Panthers high
school baseball team?'04 Unlikely, despite filter makers' claims." 5
96. See ALA, LIBRARIES AND THE INTERNET TOOLKIT, supra note 25, at 15 (on file with author);
see also ALA, A Message from the ALA, reprinted in New Mexico State Library, at
http'://,A/v.stli.state.nu.usllibraryservicesldevelop/CIPAala.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2002).
Another ironic story recounts the conversion of a pro-filtering politician to the anti-filtering camp
when his website was blocked. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. Yet another embarrassing
moment for filters came when Beaver College in Beaver County, Pennsylvania, changed its name, in
part blaming filters; prospective students and college alumni vere blocked from the website when
filters misperceived a slang reference to female genitalia. Craig Bicknell, Beaver College Not a
Filter Fave, WIRED, Mar. 22,2000, http'J/ww.wired.com/news/polities/0,1283,35091,00.html.
97. E.g., Edward Cohn & Sylvia Weedman, By Their Own Weapon, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 1998,
at 19.
98. AFA Home Page, at http://www.afa.net (last visited Apr. 30, 2002).
99. See Cohn & Weedman, supra note 97, at 19.
100. ACLU, CENSORSHIP IN ABox, supra note 25.
101. Cohn & Weedman, supra note 97, at 19.
102. Id.
103. CyberPatrol once blocked each of these sites and many more as full nudity or sex acts,
according to a Censorware investigation. CENSORVARE PROJECT, BLACKLISTED BY CYBERPATROL,
Introduction (1997), previously at http://censorvare.netlreports/cyberpatrointro.html (last visited
July 19, 2001).
104. Bess once blocked each of these sites and many more as pornography, according to a
Censorware investigation. CNSORmVARE PROJECT, PASSING PORN, BANNING THE BIBLE (2000),
previously at http'//censorware.netlreports/bess/ (last visited July 19, 2001).
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Nunberg concluded that only with keyword filtering could filters offer
the "comprehensive coverage" they promise.
0 6
By its sheer size and protean nature, the Internet defies human review.
An estimated 1.5% of the web is pornographic, t°7 amounting to "a highly
conservative estimate" of 150,000 to 200,000 websites with
pornographic content. 8 At that, the average life of a website is only
seventy-five days, as sites start, stop, and change addresses." 9 According
to Nunberg, "That's more than anyone could possibly track.""ll0 A
powerful search engine such as AltaVista.com indexes only about 15%
of the web, and all search engines cover less than half the web.' Even
then, "a filtering company would require a full-time staff of more than
2000 people just to check out the two million new pages that are added
every day."".2 Censorware concurs, observing that 750 people would
have to work 24 hours a day, seven days week, each reading and rating
two web pages a minute, just to keep up with additions to the web." 3
Considering an N2H2 staff of 15 full-timers and 58 part-timers,
105. See Nunberg, supra note 27, at 30-32.
106. Id. at 31-32.
107. Id. at 31 (citing Steve Lawrence & C. Lee Giles, Accessibility of Information on the Web,
NATURE, July 8, 1999, at 107); see also Michael Schuyler, Porn Alley: Now at Your Local Public
Library, COMPUTERS IN LIBR., Nov./Dec. 1999, at 32, 34. This number rates considerably lower
than the absurdly high eighty percent asserted by what Schuyler dismisses as the "Anti-Pom Cult,"
members of which see "pornography everywhere they turn." Schuyler, supra, (criticizing Marty
Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway: A Survey of 917.410 Images,
Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million Times by Consumers in Over
2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces, and Territories, 83 GEO. LJ. 1849 (1995), cited in
Philip Elmer-DeWitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn, TIME, July 3, 1995, available at 1995 WL
9021173); see also Philip Elmer-De Witt, Fire Storm on the Computer Nets: A New Study of
Cyberporn, Reported in a Time Coverstory, Sparks Controversy, TIME, July 24, 1995, available at
1995 WL 9021275 (challenging credibility of both Rimm and his study). In her debut television
show, radio personality Dr. Laura Schlessinger made much ado about online pornography. Dr.
Laura Show: Lewd Libraries (Paramount syndicated broadcast, Sept. 15, 2000) (on file with
author). Her claims too proved biased and grossly exaggerated. See Posting of Robert S. Willard,
Executive Director, National Commission on Libraries and nformation Science, forwarded by
Samuel Trosow (Sept. 14, 2000) (on file with author) (explaining how TV show contrived
demonstration of accidental encounter with pornography on Internet and sensationalized risk to
children to attract audience at expense of "meaningful dialog").
108. Nunberg, supra note 27, at 31.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 31-32.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. CENSORWARE PROJECT, PASSING PORN, BANNING THE BIBLE, supra note 104.
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"[t]hey're losing ground massively unless they classify huge chunks of
the web at once ... ."1' In sum, "It can't be done."' 5
Anecdotes of filter makers' blocking decisions implicate a concern
even graver than whether the decisions are arbitrary: some blocking
decisions might be motivated by politics or profit motive. No safeguard
prevents filter makers from engaging in viewpoint-based blocking
without users' knowledge. While undisclosed viewpoint biases might be
tolerable, if bothersome, to consumers in the private marketplace, they
are intolerable and illegal when adopted by government.
Recalling my experiments with CyberPatrol,11 6 1 found that when I set
the software to block "full nudity" and "sexual acts/text," it blocked the
home page of Peacefire, a fierce opponent of filtering."7 Peacefire-the
motto of which is, "It's not a crime to be smarter than your parents"--
offers links to Censorware's damning studies on filter efficacy, including
studies of CyberPatrol and Bess."' Peacefire also offers features, such as
the "Blocked Site of the Day," which mock filtering software's
imprecision.1 9 Especially troublesome to filter makers such as
SurfControl, Peacefire features free, downloadable software that
purports to empower a user to disable filters, including CyberPatrol and
SurfWatch. 2° One must wonder whether the block against Peacefire is
motivated by a desire to suppress potentially harmful criticism of
filtering. Such a criterion might appeal to some parents, especially those
not as technologically proficient as their children. By my category
114. Id. (citing N2H2 IPO filing). In a recent interview, an N2H2 official simultaneously asserted
the necessity for human review, touting a 12- to 15-member staff, and conceded that N2H2 employs
artificial intelligence to keep up with new web content. Marketplace Morning Report, supra note
74; see also Alvin Schrader, Internet Censorship: Issues for Teacher-Librarians, TCHR. LIBIL,
May/June 1999, at 8-9:
And [filter makers] all claim to have qualified staff. Nothing is disclosed, however, about the
professional qualifications of this community, how they are selected, who selects them, what
they are paid, what sort of quality control over their work is in place, or what sort of retrieval
testing is done to ensure accuracy and consistency in the resulting product.
115. CENSORWARE PROJCT, PASSING PORN, BANNING THE BIBLE, supra note 104 (emphasis in
original). Censorware further described how N2H2 contracted with Inktomi, the owner of search
engine Hotbot, "to find sites for Bess to block. If you submit your site to Hotbot, N2H2's computer
program will also review your site and determine whether it should be banned." Id.
116. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
117. Consumer Reports questioned CyberPatrol, AOL, and CyberSitter for blocking Peacefire.
Digital Chaperones for Kids, supra note 44, at 22.
118. See Peacefire Home Page, supra note 91.
119. Id.
120. Id.
Washington Law Review Vol. 77:397, 2002
restrictions, however, "full nudity" and "sexual acts/text" encompassed
neither anti-filtering rhetoric nor incitement to imminent childish
unruliness.
Filters' imprecision makes it difficult to determine whether the
blocking of anti-filtering websites results from error or deliberate bias,
but there are ample troubling instances to suggest the latter. Besides
Peacefire, according to Censorware, CyberPatrol blocked Planned
Parenthood and sites about AIDS and the environment,' all
organizations friendly with the political left. Censorware detected Bess
blocking the website of Feminists Against Censorship and the websites
of two anti-censorship activists.' Filter SafeSurf blocked the Wisconsin
ACLU; I-Gear blocked the Electronic Information Privacy Center
(EPIC); and SafeClick blocked congressional testimony unfavorable to
mandatory filtering."23 As merely a collection of reports, these examples
cannot prove a viewpoint bias by filter makers. But they do point to one
of the legal impediments to government-administered filtering: because
search criteria and site lists are secret, the public simply does not know
why these sites were blocked.2 4
121. Horowitz, supra note 94, at 434 (citing Wagner, supra note 61, at 762 n.19).
122. CENSORWARE PROJECT, PASSING PORN, BANNING THE BIBLE, supra note 104; see also
Anarchist Librarians Web Home Page, previously at http://bum.ucsd.edu/-mai/library/index.html
(last visited Sept. 13, 1999) ("New Censorware.org Report Finds That This Page Is Blocked by
BESS").
123. Nunberg, supra note 27, at 30.
124. Besides inaccuracy and possible viewpoint bias that have earned filters the wrath of free
expression advocates, filters also have privacy advocates lined up against them. EPIC revealed in
2001 that N2H2, which then provided filter service to twenty percent of U.S. school districts that
used filters, had amassed and sold data about its 14 million school-aged users. Privacy Group Blasts
N2H2 for Selling Schools' Web Logs, AM. LIBR., Feb. 5, 2001, at http://www.ala.org/alonline/-
news/20011010205.html; Web Concern N2H2 to Stop Selling Data on Schoolchildren, WALL
STREET J., Feb. 26, 2001, at B9, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2855298. N2H2 produced a product
called "Class Clicks" that broke down student surfing habits by demographics, though not personal
identity. Privacy Group, supra; Jason Anders, Web-Filter Data From Schools Put Up for Sale,
WALL STREET J., Jan. 26, 2001, at BI, available at 2001 WL-WSJ 2852270. In December 1999,
N2H2 had notified clients it would collect the information, but had said nothing about selling it. See
Privacy Group, supra. EPIC filed Freedom of Information Act requests with the U.S. Department of
Defense to find out why it bought a year's worth of the data. Id. N2H2 no longer sells "Class
Clicks." Web Concern, supra.
Questionable sales practices also have evinced the disparate aims of private enterprise and public
government. After Solid Oak pushed its Cybersitter in the wake of tragedies such as the Columbine
High School shootings, Salon magazine asked, "Cagey marketers with a sharp eye for good PR
opportunities, or soulless ghouls out to capitalize on any remotely Intemet-related tragedy to hawk
their censorware? You make the call." Andrew Leonard, Marketing in the Wake of a Massacre,
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II. THE LAW OF INTERNET FILTERING TO DATE
A. Statutes To Protect Minors by Regulating the Internet and
Resulting Litigation
Congress has now passed three principal laws intending to make the
Internet safe for children: the Communications Decency Act of 1996
(CDA), 12 5 struck down in pertinent parts by the Supreme Court in Reno
v. ACLU (Reno, or the CDA case);126 the Child Online Protection Act of
1998 (COPA), 27 thus far enjoined by the federal courts'28 and pending
decision this year by the Supreme Court as Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft,
or the COPA case);'29 and the Children's Internet Protection Act of 2000
(CIPA),'3 ° now the subject of two complaints in federal district court:
American Library Ass'n v. United States and Multnomah County Public
Library v. United States (ALA and Multnomah, together the CIPA
cases). 3 ' Of the three, the CIPA cases most directly implicate filtering.
In addition to these three federal statutes, a majority of state legislatures
have attempted, in the name of protecting children, to regulate Internet
SALON, Apr. 22, 1999, at http://wvv.salon.comtechnlog/1999/04/22/Cybersitter/index.html (last
visited Apr. 30,2002).
125. Pub. L No. 104-104, §§ 501-561, 110 Stat. 52, 133-143 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1462, 1465,2422 (2000), 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 223,230,303,330,531-532,559-561 (Supp. 2001)).
126. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
127. Pub. L No. 105-277, §§ 1403-1447, 112 Stat. 2681-1, 2681-736 to -739 (1998) (codified
at 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 230-231 (Supp. 2001)).
128. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom. Ashcroft v. ACLU,
532 U.S. 1037 (2001) (Ashcroft).
129. President George Bush's Attorney General John Ashcroft was substituted for former
President Bill Clinton's Attorney General Janet Reno after Bush took office in January 2001. While
the Clinton Administration might have been reluctant litigants in the COPA case, Bush stated while
campaigning his support for filtering. D. Ian Hopper, Officials Soften on Web Filtering, Oct. 20,
2000, available at 2000 WL 28614132. But cf. Daniel E. Troy, Advice to the New President on the
FCC and Communications Policy, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 503, 505 (2001) (urging President
Bush to "keep[] [FCC's) hands offthe Intemet").
For ease of distinction between the CDA and COPA cases, this Article will refer to the latter
consistently as Ashcroft on subsequent references, whether in the district or appellate courts, even
though the COPA case was styled ACLUv. Reno, same as the CDA case, in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania and in the Third Circuit.
130. Pub. Law No. 106-554, §§ 1701-1741, 114 Stat. 2763A-336 to -351 (2000) (codified at 20
U.S.C.A. § 9134 (2000) and 47 U.S.C.A. § 254 (Supp. 2001)).
131. ALA Compl., supra note 11; Multnomah Compl., supra note 11.
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content; the few state statutes passed and tested thus far in the courts
have fared poorly.
32
1. The CDA and Reno
Congress passed the CDA as part of a sweeping regulatory reform
effort, the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 13 At issue in Reno was 47
U.S.C. § 223, subparts (a) and (d), 34 the former "prohibit[ing] the
knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient
under 18 years of age,"' 35 and the latter "prohibit[ing] the knowing
sending or displaying of patently offensive messages in a manner that is
available to a person under 18 years of age."' 36 Both provisions were
added as Senate floor amendments after Telecommunications Act
hearings had concluded.1
37
The Supreme Court struck down both provisions as unconstitutionally
overbroad under the First Amendment. 3 ' The Court concluded as well
that the provisions were vague, as an aspect of First Amendment
overbreadth,139 but formally did not reach the question of Fifth
Amendment vagueness. 40 The lower court-a three-judge district court
panel, pursuant to the CDA's own judicial review procedure -had
ruled in favor of the ACLU on First Amendment overbreadth and Fifth
Amendment vagueness grounds.'42
132. See infra Part III.A.4.
133. Reno, 521 U.S. at 857-58 (citing Pub. L No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56).
134. Id. at 859 (citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a), (d) (Supp. 1997)).
135. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)).
136. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)).
137. Id. at 858 & n.24 (citing Exxon Amendment No. 1268, 141 CONG. REc. 15536 (1995)).
138. Id. at 864. The forty-seven plaintiffs included the ACLU; the ALA; America Online, Inc.;
American Booksellers Association, Inc.; the American Society of Newspaper Editors; CompuServe
Inc.; the Critical Path AIDS Project; the Freedom to Read Foundation; Human Rights Watch; EPIC;
the Electronic Frontier Foundation; the Ethical Spectacle; the Journalism Education Association;
Magazine Publishers of America; Microsoft Corp.; the National Press Photographers Association;
the National Writers Union; the Planned Parenthood Federation of America; Prodigy Services Co.;
the Queer Resources Directory; the Society of Professional Journalists; and Stop Prisoner Rape. Id.
at 861-62 & nn.27-28.
139. See id. at 870-74.
140. Id. at 864.
141. Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 561, 110 Stat. 142-143 (1996).
142. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 862-64 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
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The Court based its decision on two conclusions. First, the Internet
warrants no diminishment in First Amendment protection, like the
telephone in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, and
unlike the broadcast spectrum in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC and
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation."' Second, the CDA was overbroad in three
respects: (1) the CDA was overbroad when compared to (a) the adult
magazine restriction upheld in Ginsberg v. New York, (b) the radio
indecency restriction upheld in Pacifica, and (c) the adult-theater zoning
ordinance upheld in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.; (2) the terms
"indecent" and "patently offensive," as defined, or not defined, in the
statute failed to meet the precision required of harmful-to-minors
regulation pursuant to Ginsberg, or even adult obscenity regulation
pursuant to Miller v. California; 4s and (3) even had the CDA adequately
defined content harmful to minors, a lack of reasonably available
technology to accomplish the CDA's objectives rendered the statute an
impermissible "reduc[tion of] the adult population.., to... only what
is fit for children," like the telephone indecency restriction in Sable.'4
On the first point, with respect to overbreadth, the Court ruled the
CDA overbroad when compared with the restrictions upheld in
Ginsberg, Pacifica, and Renton. In Ginsberg, a New York statute barred
the sale of magazines obscene as to minors-or "harmful to minors" in
the current parlance-to those under age seventeen."7 Unlike the
Ginsberg statute, the CDA barred even parents from communicating
indecent content to their children; 4 ' the CDA was not limited to
commercial transactions;' 49 and the CDA broadened the class of minors
143. Reno, 521 U.S. at 868-70 (citing Sable Comms. of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989);
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969)). The Clinton Administration agreed. INFO. INFRASUCTURE TASK FORCE, A FRAMmvoRK
FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, previously at httpJAvww.iitf.nisLgov/eleccomrn/ecomm.
htm (last visited July 17,2001) (rejecting, in Part 111.8, "content regulations traditionally imposed on
radio and television").
144. Id. at 864-68 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726;
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)).
145. Id. at 865 (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629), 870-74 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973)).
146. Id. at 874-80; see also id. at 875 (quoting Denver Area Educ. Telecommunications
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 759 (1996) (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 128)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
147. Reno, 521 U.S. at 864.
148. Id. at 865, 878 (positing that a parent "could face a lengthy prison term" for exercising
"parental judgment").
149. Id. at 865, 877.
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to those under age eighteen.' The Court distinguished the radio
indecency regulation in Pacifica because Pacifica involved a historically
regulated medium, a regulatory process rather than a risk of criminal
prosecution, and a time restriction rather than a ban.' In distinguishing
the adult theater regulations of Renton and its progeny, the Court
rejected a zoning analogy, observing that the CDA applied to the entire
Internet and focused on speech content and impact rather than merely on
"'secondary effects'-such as crime and deteriorating property
values."'52
On the second point, with respect to overbreadth, the CDA failed to
define "indecent" and "patently offensive" sufficiently narrowly.'53 If the
CDA meant to restrict the communication of content harmful to minors,
it diverged from the statute in Ginsberg by failing to exempt content
with "redeeming social importance for minors.' 54 And even reading the
CDA to curtail only obscenity as to adults, per the Miller test, the statute
failed to exempt content with "serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value,"'55 and failed to require that restricted content consist of
"sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law."'56
The Court further rejected Congress's attempt to create in the CDA a
nationwide "community standard" for obscenity, affirming the Miller
notion that local juries play an indispensable role in defining it'57 (or at
least "know[ing] it when [they] see it"'). The first part of the Court's
three-part Miller test to define obscenity requires that "'the average
person, applying contemporary community standards,' would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest."' 59 Jurors are
150. Id. at 865-66.
151. Id. at 866-67.
152. Id. at 867-68.
153. E.g., id. at 871 ("Could a speaker confidently assume that a serious discussion about birth
control practices, homosexuality, the First Amendment issues raised by the Appendix to our
Pacifica opinion, or the consequence of prison rape would not violate the CDA?").
154. Id. at 865 (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 646) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Id. at 865 (adopting language from Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
156. Id. at 872-73 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157. Id. 873-74 & n.39.
158. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
159. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)). The
Miller test also requires that "the work depict[] or describe[], in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by applicable state law; and (that] the work, taken as a whole, lack[]
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id.
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expected to bring to the courtroom the standards of their localities. 6°
The Court observed that "the 'community standards' criterion as applied
to the Internet means that any communication available to a nation-wide
audience will be judged by the standards of the community most likely
to be offended by the message,161 an impermissible "least common
denominator" approach.
On the third point, with respect to overbreadth, the Court determined
that no technology existed by which an Internet speaker using a protocol
such as e-mail, newsgroups, or chat could know whether children were
in the audience, and no technology, such as credit-card verification or
mere free password registration, could affordably and effectively aid a
website owner in distinguishing adult audience members from
children. 62 Even were credit-card verification systems or password-
protection measures affordable, some adults do not have credit cards,
and mere password protections deter users.'63
Without a technology to meet the government's precision needs, the
CDA was hopelessly overbroad." For fear of prosecution and lack of a
technological solution, speakers would hold back, reducing the Internet
to a "level of discourse... suitable for a sandbox."'6' Imposition of any
new technology to protect children would better come from users than
from speakers, the Court suggested, quoting the district court:
.'[D]espite its limitations, currently available user-based software
suggests that a reasonably effective method by which parents can
prevent their children from accessing sexually explicit and other material
160. E.g., Eckstein v. Melson, 18 F.3d 1181, 1187 (4th Cir. 1994).
161. Reno, 521 U.S. at 877-78. The Court noted, but declined to discuss, the additional
problems presented by "extraterritorial application of the CDA." Id. at 878 n.45.
162. Id. at 876-77. The CDA provided that an age verification system, such as "credit card, debit
account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number," or other "good faith,
reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the circumstances ... which may involve any
appropriate measures to restrict minors... including any method which is feasible under available
technology," would provide an affirmative defense to prosecution. Id. 860-61 & n.26. (citing 47
U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5)).
163. Reno, 521 U.S. at 856-57 &n.23.
164. Id. at 875-77; see also id. at 877 ("The breadth of the CDA's coverage is wholly
unprecedented."). See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and
Transcending Balancing, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 141 (agreeing with the Court's conclusion, but
criticizing the Court for employing reasoning insufficiently protective of free speech).
165. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983), quoted in Reno, 521 U.S.
at 875.
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which parents may believe is inappropriate for their children will soon
be widely available."" 66
2. COPA and Ashcroft
In an effort to remedy the constitutional defects of the CDA, 16 7
Congress passed COPA in 1998 as part of a massive appropriations
bill.1 68 COPA provides civil and criminal sanctions for a web publisher
who with "commercial purposes" knowingly makes available to persons
under age seventeen material "harmful to minors.' 69 Thus, COPA marks
significant distinctions from the CDA: COPA applies only to the World
Wide Web protocol; it applies only to commercial publishers; the class
of content restricted is that which is "harmful to minors"; and minors are
persons under seventeen, not eighteen. A publisher with "commercial
purposes" "offers to make a communication, by means of the World
Wide Web, that includes any material that is harmful to minors, devotes
time, attention, or labor to such activities, as a regular course of such
person's trade or business, with the objective of earning a
profit ... (although it is not necessary that the person make a
profit... )y,171 Internet service and access providers are exempt,
"[H]armful to minors" is carefully defined in a three-prong format to
meet Ginsberg and Miller requirements for obscenity as to minors, or
166. Reno, 521 U.S. at 877 (quoting and adding emphasis to ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,
842 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). See generally Lessig, supra note 25, at 633, 670 (reluctantly warning that,
absent a "CDA-like solution," free expression interests might suffer as a result of government
"cajoling" the Internet infrastructure into "private regulation").
167. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 167 (3d Cir. 2000) (Ashcrofi) (citing H.R. REP. No. 105-775,
at 12 (1998), available at 1998 WL 691067; S. REP. No. 105-225, at 2 (1998), available at 1998
WL 413893). See generally Johanna M. Roodenburg, "Son of CDA ": The Constitutionality of the
Child Online Protection Act of 1998, 6 COMM. L. & POL'Y 227 (2001) (analyzing constitutionality
of COPA).
168. Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1401-1406, 112 Stat. 2681-736 to -739 (codified at 47 U.S.C.A.
§§ 230-231 (Supp. 2001)). COPA contains the Child Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998
(COPPA), which restricts the online collection of private information about children without
parental consent. Pub. L. No. 105-277, §§ 1301-1308, 112 Stat. 2681-728 to -735 (codified at 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 6501-6506 (Supp. 2001)). COPPA was not a target of the ACLU suit. See generally
Mark D. Robins, Coping with COPPA: Privacy, Children, and the Internet, COMPUTER LAW., June
2000, at 17, cited in Roodenburg, supra note 167, at 234 n.45.
169. 47 U.S.C.A. § 23 1(a), (e)(7) (Supp. 2001).
170. Id. § 231(e)(2)(B).
171. Id. § 231(b).
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"variable obscenity.' ' 72 Like the CDA, COPA provides affirmative
defenses for publishers who, "in good faith," restrict minors' access with
a verification method such as a "credit card, debit account, adult access
code, or adult personal identification number; ... a digital certificate
that verifies age; or ... any other reasonable measures that are feasible
under available technology."1 73 COPA also restricts the dissemination of
private information collected as part of a verification system. 74
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania preliminarily enjoined enforcement of COPA, ruling that
the ACLU and its co-plaintiffs presented a case reasonably likely to
succeed on the merits, and the Third Circuit affirmed. 7 Both courts
ruled COPA a content-based speech restriction subject to strict scrutiny,
even though, as in the CDA case, there was no question that the
government has a compelling interest in the protection of children. 76
172. Ashcroft, 217 F.3d at 167-68 & n.6 (citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(e)(6); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 23-25 (1973); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643-45 (1968); H.R. REP. No.
105-775, at 13). COPA defines content harmful to minors as:
any communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article, recording, writing, or other
matter of any kind that is obscene or that-
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking the
material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to
pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an
actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted
sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.
47 U.S.C.A. § 231(e)(6).
173. 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(c)(1).
174. Id. § 231(d).
175. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Penn. 1999), aff'd 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000),
cert. granted sub nom. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 532 U.S. 1037 (2001) (Ashcroft). Plaintiffs in the COPA
case were the ACLU; A Different Light Bookstores; American Booksellers Foundation for Free
Expression; Artnet Worldwide Corp.; Blackstripe; Condomania; Electronic Frontier Foundation;
EPIC; Free Speech Media; Internet Content Coalition; OBGYN.net; Philadelphia Gay News;
Planetout Corp.; Powell's Bookstore; Riotgrrl; Salon Internet, Inc.; and West Stock, Inc. Ashcrofl,
217 F.3d at 162.
176. Ashcroft, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 492-93, 495-96; Ashcroft, 217 F.3d at 173. The defendant
asserted in her brief that the statute may be subject to the lower level of scrutiny which has been
applied to the regulation of "commercial speech"; however, the defendant did not press that position
for the purposes of the temporary restraining order, nor did she argue this position a the preliminary
injunction hearing. Ashcrofl, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 493; Ashcroft, 217 F.3d at 179 n.22. The
"commercial purposes" term in COPA is far broader than the Supreme Court's definition of
"commercial speech," thus rendering intermediate scrutiny likely inapplicable. See Ashcrofl, 217
F.3d at 179 n.22.
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Both faulted the statute on the latter prong of strict scrutiny-narrow
tailoring. 77 The District Court described COPA's shortcomings on
several points, each focusing on the simple fact that COPA would not
protect minors. For example, foreign websites, non-commercial
websites, and non-web protocols would leave ample harmful material
available to minors.17
8
The court also seized on a suggestion by the plaintiffs that filters
provide "at least some evidence" that COPA is not the least restrictive
means to stop minors from accessing harmful material. 179 The court
noted, though, that the plaintiffs did not argue for the congressional
imposition of filtering.'
While reaching the same general conclusion as to overbreadth, the
Third Circuit emphasized a different point, and only one point.' Crucial
to the Third Circuit's analysis was COPA's "contemporary community
standards" language,8 2 which is part of the definition of "harmful to
minors" and is otherwise consistent with Supreme Court precedent since
Ginsberg and Miller. While Congress in other respects accurately
adapted language from case law to breathe life into its "harmful to
minors" conception, a vast improvement over the vague "indecency" and
"patently offensive" standards of the CDA, the Third Circuit decided
that on the worldwide Internet, "contemporary community standards"
has no functional meaning,'83 because "there is no single prevailing
community standard in the United States."' 84 The phrase "contemporary
177. Ashcroft, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 496-97; Ashcroft, 217 F.3d at 173-77.
178. See Asheroft, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 496-97. As summarized by the Third Circuit, the District
Court based its conclusion on the availability of harmful material from foreign websites; the
possibility that minors might have their own credit cards; the breadth of COPA, applicable to all
communications rather than just offensive images, the most common form of harmful content; and
the availability of "parental blocking and filtering technology." Ashcroft, 217 F.3d at 172.
179. Ashcrofl, 31 F. Supp. at 497.
180. Id. at 497 n.6.
181. Ashcroft, 217 F.3d at 173-74 &n.19.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 175 ("attempting to define what contemporary community standards should or could
mean in a medium without geographic boundaries").
184. Id. at 178 (quoting ALA v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 182-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Government pointed to United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th
Cir. 1996), an obscenity prosecution for electronic bulletin board content posted in one state and
received in another. Ashscrofl, 217 F.3d at 176. The court harmonized Thomas, observing that the
Sixth Circuit in that case had rejected any national standard for obscenity where the bulletin board
as a members-only forum from which readers in jurisdictions less tolerant of obscenity could have
been excluded. Id. at 176-77.
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community standards" would force "every Web communication to abide
by the most restrictive community's standards"-exactly the undesirable
outcome contemplated by the Reno Court when it construed the CDA'8
While valid precedent in other contexts, Miller simply "has no
applicability to the Internet and the Web, where Web publishers are
currently without the ability to control the geographic scope of the
recipients of their communications." '186 The affirmative defense of an age
verification system offered no way out for the government. Such a
system "would prevent access to protected material by any
adult.. . without the necessary age verification credentials [and] would
completely bar access to those materials to all minors under seventeen-
even if the material would not otherwise have been deemed 'harmful' to
them in their respective geographic communities."'87
While the Third Circuit purported to rely exclusively on
"contemporary community standards" overbreadth grounds, it did make
passing references to other of the District Court's rationales, 8 ' including
the District Court's recognition of filtering as a less restrictive means to
protect minors. The Third Circuit doubted that parental filtering could be
termed a less restrictive means for government to achieve its ends,189
noting that "the parental hand" is no "substitute for a congressional
mandate."19 The court must have been aware of the brewing dispute
over CIPA, but these notes do not reveal whether the Third Circuit
would approve of a congressional mandate in lieu of a parental decision
to filter.
Ashcroft is currently pending before the Supreme Court. 9 '
3. CIPA and ALA/Multnomah
Having accumulated one strike on the CDA in the Supreme Court and
a second strike on COPA in federal circuit court, Congress went back to
the drawing board in 2000. Faced with courts troubled by efforts to
silence speakers on the Internet, and by restrictions that treated adults
185. Ashscrofl, 217 F.3d at 175-77.
186. Id. at 180.
187. Id. at 175.
188. E.g., id. at 177 n.21 (noting that under COPA, minors would still have access to harmful
material on foreign-based and noncommercial websites).
189. Id. at 171 n.16.
190. Id. at 181 n.24.
191. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, (2001) (Ashcroft) (granting certiorari).
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and children alike, Congress needed a bill that could (1) target recipients
of communication rather than speakers; (2) treat adults differently from
minors; and (3) offer a minimally restrictive means to identify
unprotected content as to adults and minors respectively. The first two
goals were easily achieved. Congress focused on Internet receivers
instead of speakers by targeting the users of publicly-funded computers.
And once that focus became clear, distinguishing between minors and
adults followed easily. Almost all users in schools are minors, and
librarians can check library cards. But what of the third problem, the
minimally restrictive means? The Court, 92 indeed even the ACLU,
193
had already suggested a solution: filtering.
Like COPA the year before, CIPA was part of a massive
appropriations bill that passed in the last days of the 106th Congress,"4
and President Clinton signed the omnibus legislation despite the
Administration's preference against a federal filtering mandate. 95
Congress passed CIPA on December 15, 2000, and the President signed
the bill into law on December 21, 2000.196 The final form of CIPA
represents the "cobbl[ing] together" of multiple bills, but the original
Children's Internet Protection Act remains the component of gravest
concern.'97 It requires that federally funded libraries and primary and
secondary schools employ "a technology protection measure," i.e.,
192. The Court in Reno discussed filtering as a parental tool. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
854-55 (1997); see also id. at 890-91 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (suggesting that filtering forecasts the inevitable "zoning" of cyberspace).
193. E.g., Ashcroft, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497. At a Freedom Forum program, Ombudsman Paul
McMasters asked whether CIPA was not a problem of the ACLU's own making, because in
arguments over the CDA, the ACLU pointed to filtering as a less restrictive alternative. April Davis,
Experts Divided on Internet Filtering Legislation, FREEDOMFORUM.oRG (Feb. 21, 2001), at http.ll-
www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentlD=13157 (last visited Apr. 30, 2002);
see Lessig, supra note 25, at 632 n.15. ACLU attorney Chris Hansen responded by distinguishing
the parental choice to filter, of which the ACLU approves, from the government mandate. Audio
tape: Forum on CIPA, held by the First Amendment Center (Feb. 20, 2001) (on file with author).
194. See supra note 23.
195. See Hopper, supra note 129.
196. See supra notes 4,23.
197. See THOMAS M. SUSMAN, ROPES & GRAY, CHILDREN'S INTERNET PROTECTION: MORE
QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS 1 (Jan. 13, 2001) (handout at 2000-01 mid-winter meeting of the ALA)
(on file with author). CIPA constitutes Title XVII of the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001. Id. The original Children's Internet
Protection Act 1701 to 1721, and the Neighborhood Children's Internet Protection Act 1731 to 1733
(regarding safety policies). Id. See generally Horowitz, supra note 94 (analyzing constitutionality of
CIPA).
Vol. 77:397, 2002
Filtering in Public Libraries
filtering,1 98 on any computer with Internet access to prevent computer
users from accessing obscenity or child pornography.199 Additionally,
when a minor is using a computer, the library or school must employ
filtering to block the minors' access to material "harmful to minors. 200
Unlike COPA, CIPA contains no limitations on the Internet
communications to which it applies, whether by protocol or commercial
nature. CIPA applies to schools and libraries0 . funded under the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA)," 2 the
Museum and Library Services Act of 1996 (MLSA). 3 (namely its
included Library Services and Technology Act of 1996 (LSTA)2 4), and
most importantly, schools and libraries benefiting from the "universal
service discounts," or "e-rate funds," under the Communications Act of
1934,205 as subsequently amended by the Telecommunications Act of
1996.206 The text of CIPA is challenging to comprehend because it aims
to amend each of the statutory bases for these funding sources. Much of
the definitional language is repeated verbatim, but there are some
differences. "[I]armful to minors" is defined four times, but
uniformly.20 7 The definition again tracks the Ginsberg-Miller variable
198. "[T]echnology protection measure" is defined as "specific technology that blocks or filters
Internet access." CIPA, U.S.C. §§ 1703(b)(1), 1721(b).
199. CIPA, U.S.C. §§ 1711 (amending Title M of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6801-7100) (public schools), 1712 (amending the Museum and Library
Services Act, 20 U.S.C § 9134(b)) (public libraries), 1721 (amending Communications Act of 1934,
47 U.S.C.A. § 254(h)) (filtering, both schools and libraries), 1732 (amending Communications Act
of 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. § 254) (safety policies, both schools and libraries).
200. Id.
201. CIPA §§ 1711, 1712(a), 1721. Of federal funds, only money granted under ESEA and
LSTA may be used to purchase filtering technology. CIPA § 1721(g).
202. 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 6301-8962 (2000 & Supp. 2001).
203. Id. §§ 9101-9176.
204. Id. §§ 9121-9163.
205. Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-615 (1991 & Supp. 2001).
206. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (amending,
inter alia, 47 U.S.C.A. § 254).
207. CIPA §§ 1703(b)(2), 1711, 1712(a), 1721(c). The provisions state:
The term 'harmful to minors' means any picture, image, graphic image file, or other visual
depiction that-
(A) taken as a whole and with respect to minors, appeals to a prurient interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive way with respect to what is suitable
for minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, actual or simulated normal or
perverted sexual acts, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value as to minors.
427
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obscenity standard, though now describing only visual depictions and
with the "contemporary community standards" safeguard absent.
208
Minors are again defined as persons under age seventeen.0 9 The ESEA
and MLSA/LSTA provisions have peculiar "disabling" provisions that
state a school or library authority "may disable [a] technology protection
measure... to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful
purposes."'2 The e-rate restrictions contain a similar provision, but only
for disabling "during use by an adult," whether in a public school 21' or in
a general public library. 12 CIPA further requires that schools and
libraries adopt "Internet safety polic[ies]" regarding minors' Internet
access.
213
To continue receiving federal money, libraries and schools must
certify their compliance with CIPA.214 Though the various federal funds
at stake are coordinated by different agencies, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), which manages e-rate funding, has
assumed the lead role in developing a certification procedure.1 5 The
other responsible agencies, the Department of Education and the
Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS), will develop guidance
following the FCC's lead. 6
Id.
208. See id. The Neighborhood Internet Children's Protection Act part of CIPA, requiring local
"safety polic[ies]" to protect minors, states that local library authorities may determine what is
"inappropriate for minors." Id. § 1732 (adding 47 U.S.C. § 254(/)). CIPA itself defines "obscenity,"
"child pornography," "sexual act," and "sexual content" with reference to federal law. Id.
§§ 1703(b)(2), 1711, 1712(a), 1721(c).
209. Id. §§ 1711, 1712(a), 1721(c).
210. Id. §§ 1711-1712.
211. Id. § 1721(a).
212. Id. § 1721(b).
213. Id. § 1732.
214. Id. § 1721(a)-(b).
215. See THOMAS M. SUSMAN, ROPES & GRAY, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON CHILDREN'S
INTERNET PROTECTION LEGISLATION 2 (Jan. 13, 2001) (handout at 2000-01 mid-winter meeting of
the ALA) (on file with author).
216. Id. On April 5, 2001, the FCC released its CIPA compliance rules, effective April 20, 2001,
at least with respect to e-rate funding. In re Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv.: CIPA, CC DkL
No. 96-45, FCC No. 01-120 (adopted Mar. 30, 2001), available at 2001 WL 327640. The "Funding
Year" for the e-rate programs runs from July 1 to June 30, not to be confused with the "Fiscal
Year," which begins October 1 annually. E.g., THOMAS M. SUSMAN, ROPES & GRAY, CHILDREN'S
INTERNET PROTECTION TIMELINE 2, 8 (Jan. 13, 2001) (handout at 2000-01 mid-winter meeting of
the ALA) (on file with author). "Year 4" began July 1, 2001, and "Year 5" will begin July 1, 2002.
Id. at 8. For Year 4, the FCC requires schools and libraries to certify on FCC Form 486 that (1) they
are in compliance with CIPA for Year 4; (2) they are taking action, "including any necessary
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The FCC declined to further embellish its rules in response to public
comments, whether for or against filtering. The commission wrote that it
would defer to Congress as to the constitutionality of CIPA.217 The
commission refused to make rules governing CIPA's disabling
provisions," 8 but observed that the disabling provisions could
accommodate staff use of nonpublic computers, which are not exempt
from CIPA.219 The FCC also refused to require schools and libraries to
post Internet policies and complaint procedures;" 0 to require them to
catalog filter failures or patron complaints; 2 or to require them to
certify that their filtering mechanisms and safety policies are effective.'
In response to comments that no filter exists that is not both over- and
under-inclusive of CIPA's objectives, and that certification of CIPA
compliance might therefore be dishonest,' the FCC expressed
confidence that a "good faith effort... in a reasonable manner" would
satisfy congressional intent."' The FCC set out to implement CIPA
without burdening schools and libraries more than necessary,' and the
rules do evince a strict construction of the statute.
The ALA Board voted on January 17, 2001, to challenge CIPA and,
along with co-plaintiffs, filed a complaint in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania on March 20, 2001.6 The ACLU organized a collection of
procurement procedures, to comply with" CIPA for Year 5; or (3) CIPA does not apply because e-
rate funds are used for telecommunications but not computing services. Id. at 17. Presumably the
FCC will drop the second certification option this year, for Year 5 funding. See id. at 9. That means
subject schools and libraries must have filters in place, at latest, on July 1, 2002. Id.
217. In re Fed.-State Joint Bd., supra note 216, at 7, para. 9.
218. Id. at 23-24, para. 53.
219. Id. at 15, para. 30. The commission also observed that the disabling provisions could
accommodate what commentators pointed to as a conflict between CIPA and the federal law of
government depository libraries, which "free and open access to all citizens... regardless of age."
Id. at 15-16, para. 31.
220. Id. at 18, paras. 40-41.
221. Id. at 18-19, para. 42.
222. Id. at 16, para. 33.
223. Id. at 16-17, para. 34.
224. Id. at 17, para. 35.
225. See id. at 3, para. 2.
226. ALA, Resolution on Opposition to Federally Mandated Internet Filtering (Jan. 17, 2001),
available at http'/wvw.ala.org/alaorgloif/mandatedfiltering.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002); ALA,
CIPA Litigation, at http'J/wwv.ala.org/cipa/litigation.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002). Plaintiffs are
the ALA; the Freedom to Read Foundation; the Alaska, California, New England, and New York
library associations; the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now; Friends of the
Philadelphia City Institute Library; the Pennsylvania Alliance for Democracy (PAD); parent, library
patron, and PAD Executive Director Elizabeth Hrenda; and Philadelphia Community College
English Professor C. Donald Weinberg. ALA Compl., supra note 11, paras. 13-26. Defendants are
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libraries, patrons, and website proprietors that also filed suit on March
20, 2001.227 CIPA calls for the case to go to a three-judge district panel,
with any appeal directly to the Supreme Court."8 Both groups of
plaintiffs challenge only the IMLS and e-rate filtering-for-funding parts
of CIPA applicable to general public libraries," not the ESEA and e-
rate restrictions applicable to public schools and not the requirements for
Internet safety policies.
Seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction,20 the ALA
plaintiffs make their case in six counts. Counts 1 and 2 allege facial
violation of the First Amendment free speech and Fifth Amendment due
process "because [CIPA] conditions access to funding and discounts on
acceptance of content and viewpoint restrictions on otherwise available,
constitutionally protected speech on the Internet."'" This count, which
refers to both e-rate discounts and LSTA grants, claims that libraries are
limited public forums, and that strict scrutiny applies because CIPA is a
content- and viewpoint-based regulation. CIPA fails strict scrutiny
because it is not the least restrictive means at Congress's disposal.f 2
Count 3 alleges unconstitutional prior restraint in filters' blocking of
the United States, FCC Chairman Michael Powell, the FCC, IMLS Acting Director Beverly
Sheppard, and IMLS. Id.
227. Plaintiffs include libraries and library associations from California, Connecticut, Maine,
New York, Oregon, and Wisconsin; patrons, including minors, and including a lesbian teen; and
website proprietors, including two politicians and organizations providing information about safe
sex, homosexuality, and nudism. Multnomah Compl., supra note 11, paras. 13-19, 21-37, 199. One
of the complaining politicians is Jeffrey Pollock. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
Defendants are the United States, the FCC, and IMLS. Multnomah Compl., supra note 11, paras.
39-41.
228. CIPA § 1741, 114 Stat. 2763A-351 to -352 (2001).
229. Multnomah Compl., supra note I1, paras. 42-62; see also ALA Compl., supra note 11,
para. 4.
230. ALA Compl., supra note 11, paras. A-B.
231. Id. para. 128.
232. See id. para. 129. Both sets of plaintiffs also assert that CIPA imposes "unconstitutional
conditions," id.; Multnuomah Compl., supra note 11, para. 254, hopeful the Court might employ the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. That doctrine states: "Government cannot accomplish
indirectly-through conditioning the allocation of benefits such as ... tax subsidies-that which it
is barred from doing directly." Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional
Conditions: Federalism and Individual Rights, 4 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 460, 460 (1995). Of
course, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine depends on rejection of its evil twin, the right-
privilege doctrine, RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEEcH: A
TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 10.01 [3][a], at 10-11 to -13 (1994), especially in its modem
manifestation as the government-as-speaker doctrine.
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othervise available, constitutionally protected Internet speech. 3 Count
4 alleges a chilling effect in that patrons are unlikely to exercise their
right to receive constitutionally protected Internet speech if doing so
requires asking librarians in advance to disable filters.2 4 And counts 5
and 6 allege First/Fifth Amendment vagueness in the disabling
provisions and generally in CIPA's e-rate and IMLS provisions."
Also seeking declaratory judgment and injunction, 6 the Multnomah
plaintiffs assert an unspecified number of causes of action in nine
substantive paragraphs. They assert: (1) censorship of constitutionally
protected speech; (2) prior restraint; (3) unconstitutional conditions on
government funding; (4) over-inclusive blocking; (5) content and
viewpoint discrimination failing strict scrutiny; (6) under-inclusive
blocking; (7) arbitrariness in the disabling provisions; (8) a chilling
effect in the disabling provisions; and (9) First and Fifth Amendment
vagueness in CIPA generally. 7
The complaints' factual and legal allegations attack all of filters'
vulnerabilities: secret criteria imposed outside judicial processes, 2 8
content- and viewpoint-discrimination," inability to scan images,2 40
impossibility of automating flexible legal definitions,24 ' erroneous over-
inclusiveness, 242 and erroneous under-inclusiveness. 243 The complaints
further attack CIPA's lack of a "contemporary community standards"
criterion;' CIPA's lack of a parental opt-out;245 the vagueness, potential
233. ALA Compl., supra note 11, para. 138.
234. Id. para. 140.
235. Id. paras. 142,144.
236. Multnomah Compl., supra note 11, paras. A-B.
237. Id. paras. 252-60.
238. ALA Compl., supra note 11, paras. 5, 33, 35, 112; Multnomah Compl., supra note 11,
paras. 3, 7, 97.
239. ALA Compl., supra note 11, paras. 5, 34, 44, 107; Multnomah Compl., supra note 11,
paras. 3, 88,256.
240. ALA Compl., supra note 11, para. 40, 115; Multnomah Compl., supra note 11, paras. 92,
99, 116.
241. ALA Compl., supra note 11, paras. 5, 43, 76, 78, 110-11, 113; Multnomah Compl., supra
note 11, paras. 3, 86, 89, 125.
242. ALA Compl., supra note 11, paras. 5, 36, 38, 44-45, 75-76, 114, 116-17; Multnomah
Compl., supra note 11, paras. 3, 84, 104-10, 117, 122, 255.
243. ALA Compl., supra note 11, para. 42; Multnomah Compl., supra note 11, paras. 4, 85, 111,
257.
244. Multnomah Compl., supra note 11, para. 64.
245. ALA Compl., supra note 11, para. 86, 123.
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chilling effect, and administrative burden of the disabling provisions;...
the "digital divide" problem created by filtering public computers on
which low-income persons and rural residents depend;247 and the breadth
of application to all computers in a federally funded facility regardless of
whether federal money bought those computers.245
The plaintiffs' allegations include an interesting assortment of data:
o The Internet contains more than 1.5 billion web pages; 249
more than 400 million people use the Internet. °
o Less than two percent of web pages contain sexually explicit
content.
2 5 1
o "At least one member of almost forty-five percent of all U.S.
households visited a public library within the last month. Among
households with children under the age of eighteen, nearly sixty-
one percent visited a library within the last month.2
25 2
o U.S. reference librarians answer more than seven million
questions weekly. 3
o Ninety-five percent of public libraries offer public Internet
access.254 Ninety-five percent of those libraries with public Internet
access have acceptable use policies (AUPs)."
246. ALA Compl., supra note 11, paras. 7, 60, 87-89, 93, 108, 120-22; Multnomah Compl.,
supra note 11, paras. 5, 45, 129-30, 183, 258-59. The Multnomah plaintiffs suggest that the
absence of a disabling provision as to minors forecloses even application of a library's challenge
procedure, cutting minors off from constitutionally protected content blocked erroneously. See
Multnomah Compl., supra note 15, para. 185.
247. ALA Compl., supra note 11, paras. 55, 62-63, 68-72, 106; Multnomah Compl., supra note
11, paras. 2,48, 52, 79-81, 124,181.
248. ALA Compl., supra note 11, paras. 6, 95-96, 99-101, 118-19; Multnomah Compl., supra
note 11, paras. 62-63, 123.
249. Multnomah Compl., supra note 11, para. 112. Or at least one billion "with several million
new websites created each day." ALA Compl., supra note 11, para. 28.
250. ALA Compl., supra note 11, para. 29; Multnomah Compl., supra note 11, 65.
251. ALA Compl., supra note 11, para. 30.
252. Multnomah Compl., supra note 11, para. 73.
253. Id. para. 74.
254. ALA Compl., supra note 11, para. 53 (citing Bertot & McClure, Public Libraries and the
Internet 2000: Summary Findings and Data Tables, in REPORT TO NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
LIBRARIES AND INFORMATION SCIENCE 3 (Sept. 7, 2000)); Multnomah Compl., supra note 11,
para. 76.
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* Less than seventeen percent of those libraries with public
Internet access use filters in some capacity.26 Less than seven
percent of those libraries with public Internet access use filters on
all computer terminals.2 7
" .. [M]ost [filters] fail[] to block one objectionable site in
five,"' according to a Consumer Reports study.2 8 All filters tested
blocked no better than four objectionable sites in five.2 9 "Some
blocking programs blocked as many as one in five [legitimate]
sites. 2
60
* About 49% of public libraries receive e-rate discounts,26'
which have summed more than $190 million "since the program's
inception,"262 and "70% of libraries serving communities with
poverty levels in excess of 40% receive e-rate discounts."
• LSTA-authorized funding totaled $166.2 million in the 1999
fiscal'year.2'
Finally, the ALA plaintiffs suggest less restrictive alternatives to
filtering, including: library educational programs; "clear, specific" AUP
standards and instructions regarding illegal content; content-neutral
restrictions such as time and printing limits; informal appellate
mechanisms; training, tutorials, and site lists developed for children;
privacy screens and screensavers; and anti-disruption policies.265
The ALA and Multnomah cases are currently in pretrial motions in
federal district court.2'
255. ALA Compl., supra note 11, para. 56 (citing LIBR. REs. CTR., GSLIS, UNIV. OF ILL,
SURVEY OF INTERNET ACCESS MANAGEMENT IN PUBUC LIBRARIES 7-8 (2000), at http://-
www.lis.uiuc.edu/gslis/research/internet.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2002)).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. para. 42 (quoting Digital Chaperonesfor Kids, supra note 44, at 22).
259. Multnomah Compl., supra note 11, para. 121 (citing Digital Chaperones for Kids, supra
note 44).
260. Id.
261. ALA Compl., supra note 11, para. 69 (citing Bertot & McClure, supra note 254, at 4).
262. Id. para. 68.
263. Id. para. 69 (citing Bertot & McClure, supra note 254, at 4).
264. Multnomah Compl., supra note 11, para. 61.
265. ALA Compl., supra note 11, para. 125.
266. ALA, IMPORTANT CIPA DATES, at http.//vwvw.ala.org/cipa/importantcipadates.html (last
visited Apr. 30, 2002); see Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Responds to Confusion Over Library
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State legislatures have worked themselves into a frenzy of efforts to
restrict Internet expression and access to that expression,267 even while
federal Internet regulation struggles in the courts, and even after the
courts enjoined three state statutes-in New York, New Mexico, and
Michigan-modeled on the CDA and COPA. For example, laws in
Oklahoma, Connecticut, and Georgia currently prohibit various online
communications. Oklahoma prohibits expression "harmful to minors,"
when expressed to minors.268 Connecticut prohibits "harass[ing],
annoy[ing,] or alarm[ing]" communications to any person.269 And in
Georgia, "vulgar" expression is not allowed to minors under fourteen.270
Recent, third-generation state statutes are modeled on CIPA, aiming
to protect minors through the mandatory imposition of filtering in public
schools and libraries, sometimes as a condition of public funding.27' By
the end of 2001, ten states had legislated filtering to some extent.272 At
least eleven other state legislatures had filtering bills on the table.273
These statutes and bills do not account for the untold number of
localities that have imposed filtering by ordinance or regulation,274
Blocking Software Law; Seeks December Trial Date in Legal Challenge (May 17, 2001), at
http://www.aclu.org/news/200l/n051701a.html (last visited Apr. 30,2002).
267. See ACLU, ONLINE CENSORSHIP IN THE STATES, at http.//www.aclu.orglissues/cyber/
censor/stbills.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002) (citing various bills pending in 1998 and statutes then
in force); see also Barbara H. Smith, To Filter or Not To Filter: The Role of the Public Library in
Determining Internet Access, 5 COMM. L. & POL'Y 385, 413 (2000) ("Between 1995 and 1999, at
least twenty-five states considered or passed legislation affecting Internet content .....
268. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1040.76 (Supp. 2001).
269. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183 (Supp. 2001).
270. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-39 (1999).
271. See Semitsu, supra note 16, at 524-25.
272. See Table accompanying notes 277-78, infra.
273. See 2001 Haw. H.B. 126; 2001 Haw. S.B. 142; 2001 Haw. S.B. 808; 2001 Ill. H.B. 806;
2001 Ind. H.B. 1793; 2001 Miss. H.B. 393; 2001 Mo. H.B. 393; 2001 Mo. H.B. 407; 2001 Mo.
S.B. 42; 2001 Mo. S.B. 214; 2000 N.J. A.B. 2196; 2001 N.Y. A.B. 4147; 2001 N.Y. A.B. 4188;
2001 N.C. H.B. 478; 2001 N.C. S.B. 599; 2001 N.C. S.B. 1032; 2001 Ohio H.B. 94; 2001 Pa. H.B.
10; 2001 Pa. H.B. 583; 2001 Tex. H.B. 2713; 2001 Tex. H.B. 2824; 2001 Tex. S.B. 1310; see also
2001 I1. H. Res. 359; 2001 Ill. S. Res. 157.
274. E.g., Rolando Jos6 Santiago, Comment Internet Access in Public Libraries: A First
Amendment Perspective, 32 URB. LAW. 259, 259-60 (2000) (citing Jessica Kowal & Matthew
McAllester, Stopping Smut on the Web: For Schools, Libraries, It's Decency vs. Liberty,
NEWSDAY, Apr. 5, 1998, at A07); Wayne Risher, Porn Blocking Software Works at Library,
[MEMPHIS] COM. APPEAL, Jan. 6,2000, at B3, available at 2000 WL 4435156.
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sometimes pursuant to statutes that merely require AUPs,275 or federal
and state public agencies that have imposed filtering of their own
volition.
276
Table
FILTERS IN PUBLIC LIBRARIES ("PI')
AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS ("PS") BY STATE STATUTE (2001)277
State PLIPS Broadest Content Restriction Users Notes
Affected
Ariz. PL harmful/illegal to minors minors a
PS harmful/illegal to minors unspecified
Ark. PS harmful/illegal to minors unspecified
Colo. PL harmful/illegal to minors minors a, b
PS harmful/illegal to minors minors a, b
Ky. PS sexually explicit students
La. PS hostile or dangerous school environment, students and c
pervasively vulgar, excessively violent, or employees
sexually harassing
Minn. PL harmful/illegal to minors minors <17 d
illegal all b, d
PS harmful/illegal to minors students d
illegal all b, d
s.c.
27 8  PL harmful/illegal to minors minors e
hardeore pornography all e, f
Va. PS harmful/illegal to minors students a
illegal students and a
employees
a. Statute is permissive, or AUP vithout filtering may be acceptable.
b. Restriction is tied to public funding.
c. "[Llegitimate scientific or educational purpose" excepted upon approval. Daily newspapers of
1000+ circulation are excepted for students.
d. "[O]ther effective methods" permitted, but statute aims for filtering.
e. Limited pilot program.
f. "Literary, artistic, political, or scientific purpose" excepted for adults upon request.
275. E.g., IND. CODE § 20-14-1-7 (2001).
276. E.g., Greenville, South Carolina Public Library To Filter Most Computers, LIaR. J.
DIGrTAL NEWS, July 24, 2000; David Moon, Filter T/if, UNIV. BUS., Apr. 1999, at 60 (describing
frustration with SurfWatch at the Boalt Hall Law School Library, University of California-
Berkeley); George L Seffers, Army Casts Internet Filters, FED. COMUTER WEEK, Apr. 23, 2001
(describing $1.8 million contract avard to WebSense Enterprises to filter access for more than
500,000 Army employees in the United States, Europe, and the Pacific Rim).
277. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 34-502 (Supp. 2000); 2001 Ark. H.B. 1003 (codified at ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 6-21-111, 13-2-104(a) (Michie Supp. 2001)); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-90-404(d) (2000);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-262n (Supp. 2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 156.675 (Michie Supp. 2001);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:100.7 (West 2001); MINN. STAT. §§ 125B.15, 134.50 (Supp. 2001); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 10-1-206 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-70.2 (Michie Supp.
2001).
278. See South Carolina Attorney General Pushes Filters, Promises Defense, LmR. J. DIGITAL
NEWS, July 24, 2000.
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The Arkansas experience is illustrative. A law passed in spring 2001
requires, pursuant to pending state regulations, that public schools
employ filters to protect minors against harmful material, defined per
Ginsberg and Miller, and that public schools and public libraries both
develop AUPs to protect minors. 9 The bill initially required filtering in
both public schools and libraries, for minors and adults.28 ' An Arkansas
House Committee passed that version unanimously despite testimony
from this author that it would be unconstitutional if enacted.281 In
response to vociferous opposition from the Arkansas Library
Association (ArLA), the Arkansas ACLU, and librarians in the state, the
Arkansas Senate Technology Committee amended the bill so that public
libraries came under the AUP, but not the filtering, provision. Much to
the chagrin of the Senate committee, the same coalition still objected.
ArLA represents school libraries, too, and school librarians came out in
force against the bill. When this author asserted to one senator, who is an
attorney, that the bill raised constitutional problems, he responded that
the constitutional problems had been remedied by limiting the bill's
application to schools. 282 When I suggested that minors also have
constitutional rights at stake, he answered, "Then we should amend the
Constitution." In all, besides the bill's sponsor, only one person, a
parent, testified in favor of mandatory filtering. The final bill passed
despite overwhelming opposition in committee hearings from parents,
librarians, educators, and lawyers.
The courts have thrice enjoined Internet-restrictive state statutes.
Most recently in American Library Ass "n v. Pataki,5 3 with the Supreme
Court's decision in Reno pending, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York granted a preliminary injunction to an
ACLU coalition challenging a New York law that legislators "designed
279. 2001 Ark. H.B. 1003 (Apr. 12, 2001) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-21-111, 13-2-
104(a) (Michie Supp. 2001)).
280. 2001 Ark. H.B. 1003 (Jan. 8, 2001) (codified as amended at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-21-111,
13-2-104(a) (Michie Supp. 2001).
281. This author testified against the bill multiple times in Arkansas's 2001 legislative session. I
personally witnessed the incidents recounted here.
282. Author's Conversation with Senator John E. Brown at the Arkansas Capitol (Feb. 19,2001).
School librarians asserted that filtering will unconstitutionally restrict their Internet use, as well as
the Internet use of teachers and minors, but the committee never addressed that problem.
283. 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
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to avoid the constitutional pitfalls presented by the CDA."2 "4 The New
York law criminalized online communication to minors of "nudity,
sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse ... which is harmful to
minors," further defining "harmful to minors" similarly to COPA.215 The
court ruled that the statute was a per se violation of the Commerce
Clause because of interference with interstate communication and
commerce. 286 A California art dealer, for example, would risk
prosecution in New York for displaying art online to a prospective buyer
in Oregon.7 Though declining to examine the First Amendment issues
in the case,288 the court rejected New York State's contention that "only
a small percentage of Internet communications are 'harmful to minors'
and would fall within the proscriptions of the statute." '289
I note that in the past, various communities within the United
States have found works including I Know Why the Caged Bird
Sings by Maya Angelou, Funhouse by Dean Koontz, The
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn by Mark Twain, and The Color
Purple by Alice Walker to be indecent.... I point out that a
famous painting by Manet which shows a nude woman having
lunch with two fully clothed men was the subject of considerable
protest when it first was unveiled in Paris, as many observers
believed that it was "scandalous." '
Though ruling on interstate commerce grounds, the court observed
that even communities within New York cannot agree on obscenity,
noting that hardcore pornographic films such as Deep Throat have been
ruled non-obscene in New York City.
29!
In ACLU v. Johnson'2 and Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v.
Engler,'3 the United States District Courts for the District of New
284. Id. at 183 (analyzing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21(3) (2000)).
285. Id. at 163 (analyzing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.15-.24 (2000)).
286. Id. at 168-69.
287. Id. at 174.
288. Id. at 183.
289. Id. at 180.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 183 n.10 (citing United States v. Various Articles of Obscene Merch. Schedule No.
2102,709 F.2d 132, 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1983)).
292. ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D.N.M. 1998), issuing prelim. in. after den. mots.
to dismiss, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (D.N.M. 1998) (Johnson 1), and inj. a/t'd, ACLU v. Johnson, 194
F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (Johnson 11).
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Mexico and the Eastern District of Michigan both granted injunctions to
ACLU coalitions challenging state laws in the post-CDA generation.
The Tenth Circuit, in 1999, affirmed the preliminary injunction in New
Mexico.2 94 The Sixth Circuit, in 2000, affirmed the preliminary
injunction in Michigan,29- and the court in Michigan in 2001 made that
injunction permanent. 96 The New Mexico law would have prohibited
the online transmission to minors of depictions of "nudity, sexual
intercourse or any other sexual conduct. '297 The narrower Michigan law
would have prohibited Internet speakers from communicating content
"harmful to minors" online.29 8 Not surprisingly, in light of Reno each
court ruled that the statute under its consideration was likely
overbroad,2 99 or likely to fail strict scrutiny.300 And not surprisingly in
light of Pataki, each court ruled that the statute under its consideration
violated the Commerce Clause.30'
Like the Court in Reno, the district court in Cyberspace
Communications pointed to filtering, specifically parental filtering, as a
less restrictive means of serving the compelling government interest,
having taken testimony on the subject.32 Indeed, in a section entitled
"Fundamental Right of Child Rearing," the court went even further in
dicta, explicating a "good argument" that "Plaintiffs did not raise. 30 3
The court described the "duty[] of every parent to teach and mold
293. Cyberspace Communications., Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Mich. 1999)
(Cyberspace Communications 1), prelim. inf. aff'd, , Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler,
238 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2000) (Cyberspace Communications 11), on remand, granting mot. summ.j.,
Cyberspace Communications., Inc. v. Engler, 142 F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (Cyberspace
Communications III).
294. Johnson 11, 194 F.3d at 1164.
295. Cyberspace Communications 1, 238 F.3d 420.
296. Cyberspace Communications 11, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 831.
297. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(A) (Michie Supp. 2001).
298. MICH. COMp. LAwS ANN. §§ 722.671-.682 (West 1993 & Supp. 2001).
299. Johnson 11, 194 F.3d at 1162 n.10; ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (D.N.M.
1998) (Johnson 1); Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 753 (E.D.
Mich. 1999) (Cyberspace Communications 1).
300. Johnson 11, 194 F.3d at 1158-60; Cyberspace Communications 11, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 830.
301. Johnson 11, 194 F.3d at 1160-63 (repeatedly citing Am. Library Assoc. v. Pataki, 969 F.
Supp. 160, 168-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)); Johnson , 4 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34 (citing Patad, 969 F.
Supp. at 177-80); see also Cyberspace Communications I1, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 830-31 (citing
Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 175); Cyberspace Communications 1, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 751-52 (citing
Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 175, 177).
302. Cyberspace Communications 1, 55 F. Supp. 2d at 752-53.
303. Id. at 752.
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children's concepts of good and bad, right and wrong .... in the
confines of... [the] home." ''  The availability of technology to limit
children's Internet access constitutes "less restrictive means" that
obviate the need for government restrictions at the expense of adults'
rights, the court concluded." 5 In its subsequent opinion, the court added
that it "previously took judicial notice that every computer is
manufactured with an on/off switch that parents may utilize, in the end,
to control the information which comes into their home via the
Internet."3 6 Thus, the court seemed untroubled that the "less restrictive
means" to protect children were a means available to parents, not
necessarily to government.
B. Constitutional and Case Law Pertinent to Internet Filtering
1. Before the Internet: From the First Amendment to Pico
Underpinning the legal debate on Internet filtering are two thinly
developed but vital concepts in constitutional law: first, the First
Amendment right to receive information and ideas, as apart from the
right to express oneself; and second, the historically significant and
almost sacrosanct role of the public library as a locus for the exercise of
this right to receive.
The First Amendment, incorporated through the due process clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 7 protects the freedom of
speech,"' which includes a guarantee of free expression in electronic
media.30 9 The First Amendment also guarantees the corollary freedom to
receive expression.31 This "right to receive" operates without regard to
304. Id.
305. Id. at 752-53.
306. Cyberspace Communications 11I, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 830.
307. Giflow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
308. See U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech....").
309. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868-70 (1997).
310. E.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976). The Supreme Court
referred to the right to receive as early as 1943, in Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143
(1943), cited in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). In 1969, the Court in Stanley v.
Georgia described "the right to receive information and ideas" as "well established.' Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). The Supreme Court again recognized the right in Reno. Reno,
521 U.S. at 874.
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"the social worth" of the expression.3" Rejecting a conviction for private
possession of obscenity in Stanley v. Georgia, the Court broadly
construed the right to receive-or First Amendment liberty generally-
to include the freedom from state action "to control men's minds" and
"the right to be free from state inquiry into the contents of [one's
personal] library. '31 2 The right to receive exists in a First Amendment
"penumbra" where it has played a role in the formulation and
restatement of other constitutional rights, including the right to
privacy,313 the right to express and receive commercial speech,34 and a
limited right of access to government.3 5
Functionally, the right to receive does not stand apart from the
freedom of expression; both trigger the same analyses and thus are
considered at once when both rights are at stake. The Reno Court
discussed simultaneously the impact of Internet regulation on the rights
316to express and receive, understanding that the twin rights are
inextricable.3 17
The right to receive is critically important in the public library.
"Libraries are the archetypal traditional government-funded loci for
acquiring knowledge, just as streets and parks are by tradition the
archetypal government-funded loci for speaking., 318 As such, libraries
311. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564 (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)).
312. Id. at 565.
313. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482-83.
314. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57
(1976).
315. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,576 (1980) (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972)) (identifying a right of access to the courtroom); see also Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832 (1974) (recognizing right to receive but refusing to find a right of
access to prison inmates).
316. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997).
317. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (citing Red Lion Broad. Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-90 (1969) (public right to hear diverse views on radio); Lamont v.
Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (public right to receive communist literature in mail);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) (labor organizer's right to speak and union members'
right to hear)), cited in Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576; see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974) (invalidating state restrictions on prison inmate mail, recognizing that "the
interests of both parties are inextricably meshed"), overruled on unrelated grounds by Thornburgh
v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401,413-14 (1989).
318. Bernard W. Bell, Filth, Filtering, and the First Amendment: Ruminations on Public
Libraries' Use of Internet Filtering Software, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 191, 221 (Mar. 2000) (footnotes
omitted).
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should be preserved for all manner of public inquiry." 9 In our society
libraries might indeed be as important as public parks. But libraries are
far more shy when it comes to appearing in case law. There are scarcely
two prominent Supreme Court opinions concerning public libraries-
Brown v. Louisiana32° and Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free
School District No. 26 v. Pico32 t-and their present-day rings of
authority come more from persistent echoes than from enduring vitality.
Brown gave the Supreme Court an occasion to speak to the
importance of the public library. In 1966, the Court reversed the
conviction of five African-American men who refused to leave a
segregated public library and were convicted of breaching the peace.32
The case was decided with regard for the men's right to peaceably
assemble and express their opposition to segregation.323 Brown presented
no issue pertaining to specific library content or the patron's freedom to
receive, rather than express. One of the defendants asked for a book, and
the librarian obtained it for him.324 Nevertheless, the Court opined on the
nature of the library: "It is an unhappy circumstance that the locus of
these events was a public library-a place dedicated to quiet, to
knowledge, and to beauty."32 Referring to the racial segregation policy,
the Court added that regulation of public libraries must be "reasonable
and nondiscriminatory. ' 326 Regulations may not be invoked "as a pretext
for pursuing those engaged in lawful, constitutionally protected exercise
of their fundamental rights.
327
In 1982, a Court plurality decided Pic--a case about the censorship
of specific content in a secondary-school library-in favor of teenage
library patrons. In response to objections from a conservative parent
group, a local school board in New York ordered the removal from a
high school library of nine books the board deemed "anti-American,
319. Id.
320. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
321. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
322. Brown, 383 U.S. at 136-38, 143.
323. Id. at 141-42.
324. Id. at 136-37.
325. Id. at 142. Even dissenting Justice Black agreed as to the library's "dedicat[ion]," while he
regretted what he perceived as the Court's invitation to protestors to disrupt library quiet. Id. at 167
(Black, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 143.
327. Id.
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anti-Christian, anti-Sem[i]tic, and just plain filthy.""32 The books
included the anonymous Go Ask Alice, the Langston Hughes-edited Best
Short Stories of Negro Writers, and Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughter House
Five.329 The plurality in Pico determined as a threshold matter that the
First Amendment rights at stake in the case were in no way diminished
because the complainants were minors, because the library was in a
school, or because the right to receive rather than the freedom of
expression was the implicated right.33° While acknowledging that the
courts should be reluctant to "intervene in the resolution of conflicts
which arise in the daily operation of school systems," the plurality stated
that intervention is warranted when "basic constitutional values"--such
as the right to receive-are "directly and sharply implicate[d]" in those
conflicts.331
The plurality immediately distinguished the Pico dispute from
questions of a curricular nature, over which local school boards have
considerable control. 32 "[U]se of the Island Trees school libraries is
completely voluntary on the part of students. Their selection of books
from these libraries is entirely a matter of free choice; the libraries afford
them an opportunity at self-education and individual enrichment that is
wholly optional." '333 The plurality also restricted Pico to library book
removal, not book acquisition or selection.334 The case presented a
328. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 856-57 (1982)
(citing Pico v. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387, 390 (E.D.N.Y.
1979) (upholding the book removal)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
329. Id. at 857 n.3.
330. Id. at 866-67. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1942),
the Supreme Court established minors' entitlement to First Amendment rights sufficiently vigorous
to trump a school's administrative and curricular preferences. Id. at 642. In 1969, the Court stated
that minors "[do not] shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). These
precedents formed a basis for Pica's application of the right to receive in the high school context.
See Pico, 457 U.S. at 864-66, 868, 870-72.
331. Pico, 457 U.S. at 866 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
332. Id. at 862.
333. Id. at 869.
334. Id. at 862; see also id. at 871-72 (plurality writing without Justice Blackmun joining).
Though the terms may appear interchangeably in this Article, "selection," technically, refers to the
librarian's decisions, while "acquisition" refers to the purchasing process that follows. ROSE MARY
MAGRILL & JOHN CORBIN, ACQUISITIONS MANAGEMENT AND COLLECTION DEVELOPMENT IN
LIBRARIES 1 (2d ed. 1989).
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question concerning the "right to receive information and ideas."335 The
plurality acknowledged that "the State may not, consistently with the
spirit of the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available
knowledge. 336
Quoting Brown's "quiet... knowledge. . beauty" phrase, the
plurality found the school library a suitable place for students to exercise
First Amendment rights.337 "[S]tudents must always remain free to
inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding."338
The school library is the principal locus of such freedom. As one
District Court has well put it, in the school library[,] "a student can
literally explore the unknown, and discover areas of interest and
thought not covered by the prescribed curriculum .... Th[e]
student learns that a library is a place to test or expand upon ideas
presented to him, in or out of the classroom." '339
In this principal locus for receiving information and ideas, the school
board might have infringed on students' rights. If the board intended by
its removal decision to expunge disagreeable views, the board might
indeed have violated the Constitution.340 The Court remanded that
factual question of intent."4
Pico thus appears to extend to a high school library the ordinary
viewpoint-discrimination prohibition common in modem public forum
analysis.342 Under the Court's modem public forum analysis, private
speech can occur on government property in three types of forums:
335. Pico, 457 U.S. at 867 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
336. Id. at 866 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Court also quoted James Madison: '"A popular Government, without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps
both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own Governors,
must arm themselves with the power which knowledge gives."' Id. at 867 (quoting 9 WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunted. 1910)).
337. Id. at 868 (quoting Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
338. Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
339. Id. at 868-69 (quoting Right to Read Def. Comm. v. Sch. Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 715
(D. Mass. 1978)).
340. Id. at 870-71 (plurality writing without Justice Blackmun joining).
341. See id. at 875.
342. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985); Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 57 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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traditional public forums; limited, or designated public forums;343 and
nonpublic forums.3" In traditional public forums, places such as streets
and parks historically open to free expression, the government can only
impose content-based restrictions on speech by overcoming the
extremely demanding strict scrutiny standard. Thus, the government
must demonstrate a compelling state interest in its restriction and show
that the restriction is the least restrictive alternative available to achieve
that interest.34 The same strict scrutiny standard applies in limited, or
designated, public forums, which are spaces not traditionally open for
free expression, but opened by government "policy and practice." '346
Only in nonpublic forums, such as a typical government office building,
is the government's burden lessened to intermediate scrutiny, or a
reasonableness inquiry.34 In none of the three forum types is viewpoint
discrimination permissible.348
The language of modern public forum analysis naturally does not
appear in Pico because the doctrine was then in its infancy. But the type
of forum at issue in Pico becomes important when applying the case to
modem problems. The viewpoint-discrimination prohibition that appears
in Pico is prohibited today in all three of the forum types; not even in a
nonpublic forum may the government discriminate against private
expression on the basis of viewpoint. But the Court's efforts to
distinguish the school library from the school curriculum suggest that
Pico treated the school library as a limited public forum. Pico analogized
to an earlier case, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,
349
in which the Court upheld student First Amendment rights against an
administration ban on black armbands as a war protest. Censorship
would have been appropriate only if the student expression had caused a
material and substantial disruption of the school's educational mission,
or invaded the rights of others in the school. 35 ° Later, in 1988, the Court
distinguished Tinker in allowing a school principal to censor a curricular
343. There is no legally significant difference between a designated public forum and its subset
limited public forum. SeeKreimerv. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1261 & n.21 (3d Cir. 1992).
344. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
345. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
346. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
347. Id. at 800.
348. Id. at 473 U.S. at 811; Perry, 460 U.S. at 57.
349. 393 U.S. 503.
350. Id. at513.
Vol. 77:3 97, 2002
Filtering in Public Libraries
student newspaper, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier .35 The
school principal was permitted to censor to achieve legitimate
pedagogical objectives." 2 The modem understanding of the Tinker-
Hazelwood dichotomy is that the former expression, the black armbands,
occurred in the school generally, a limited public forum, while the
student newspaper, a curricular exercise, was a nonpublic forum. 3
"Material and substantial disruption" restates public-forum strict
scrutiny, while "legitimate pedagogical objectives" restates nonpublic-
forum intermediate scrutiny.354 Because Pico analogized to Tinker, the
public school library in Pico was a limited public forum.
Unfortunately, the Pico plurality added a dictum that blurs the
otherwise attractively clean line between the non-curricular limited
public forum and the curricular nonpublic forum.35 ' The plurality wrote
that had the school board removed the books for reasons of "educational
suitability" or because they were "pervasively vulgar," removal would
have been "perfectly permissible."3 6 Those criteria sound more like
legitimate pedagogical objectives than like material and substantial
disruption, i.e., the criteria sound more like the reasonableness test in a
nonpublic forum than like the watered-down strict scrutiny test in a
limited public forum. The discrepancy might be neutralized by
understanding the dicta in the context of the plurality's general
discussion of the curricular/non-curricular distinction; i.e., only if the
school board in some way had adopted these into the curriculum could
there be an "educational suitability" question.
Pico remains a staple case in First Amendment law,357 but the case
was decided by a splintered Court, undermining the decision's
precedential value. Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion, in which
351. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
352. Id. at 273. Lower courts since Hazelwood have made a mockery of the legitimacy inquiry,
allowing gross administrator encroachment on student rights, and even on teachers' rights, in
curricular contexts. See ROBERT S. PECK, LIBRARIES, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND CYBERSPACE:
WHAT YOUNEED TO KNOW 109, 112 (2000); Peltz, supranote 13, at 495-500.
353. See, e.g., Rosemary C. Salomone, Public Forum Doctrine and the Perils of Categorical
Thinking: Lessons from Lamb's Chapel, 24 N.M. L REV. 1, 19-20 (1994).
354. E.g., id.
355. E.g., PECK, supra note 352, at 109.
356. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982)
(plurality writing without Justice Blackmun joining).
357. See STEVEN H. SIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES-
COMENTS-QUETONS 474-80 (3d ed. 2001); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, REGULATION OF MASS MEDIA, FREEDOM OF RELIGION 188-99 (1999);
WILLIAM XV. VAN ALSTYNE, FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 384-99 (2d ed. 1996).
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Justices Marshall and Stevens joined; Justice Blaclanun joined the
plurality opinion only in parts.358 Justice Blackmun refused to embrace
the plurality's "right to receive" rationale, instead focusing on the school
board's wrongful suppression of ideas.359 Justice White filed a
concurring opinion; he would have remanded for the resolution of what
he perceived as unresolved factual disputes.360 Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor filed four separate dissenting
opinions. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor
uniformly framed the issue as a discretionary matter for local
government. 36" The school board, in a simple and proper exercise of
local authority, and inevitably influenced by "personal or moral values,"
decided what messages it preferred to convey in expending money and
library shelf space. 36 3 "[G]overnment as educator," Justice Rehnquist
concluded, is like "government as employer [or] property owner,""
certainly a Hazelwood view of the school library. Justice Powell added
his "genuine dismay" at the plurality's usurpation of local authority.365
All four dissenting Justices rejected any heightened constitutional
interest students might have in the school library, as apart from the
tightly controlled student curriculum. 366
358. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 855.
359. See id. at 877-78 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
360. See id. at 883-84 (White, J., concurring).
361. See id. at 885-921 (Burger, C.J., Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, JJ., variously
dissenting).
362. See id. at 889, 891 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 909-10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at
921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
363. Id. at 909-10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also id. at 889, 891 (Burger, CJ., dissenting);
id. at 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist wrote: "The effective acquisition of
knowledge depends upon an orderly exposure to relevant information." Id. at 914 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); cf. Kay S. Hymowitz, Tinker and the Lessons from the Slippery Slope, 48 DRAKE L
REV. 547, 554-55, 565-66 (2000) (asserting that the courts erred in expanding civil rights for
"citizens in training," and that such decisions threaten freedom by undermining child development).
364. Pico, 457 U.S. at 920 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
365. See id. at 894 (Powell, J., dissenting).
366. See id. at 892-93 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 895 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 910
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Arguably, the four dissenters'
position that management of the school library is in its entirety a curricular matter, thus the school
library is a nonpublic forum, should be binding precedent. Justice White expressed no opinion on
the constitutional questions presented, and Justice Blackmun's narrow ruling disfavoring viewpoint
discrimination is consistent with the school library as nonpublic forum. Thus the proposition
enjoyed the support of a Court plurality. But cf. infra Part IV.C (arguing that general public library
must be public forum).
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The Chief Justice and Justices Powell and Rehnquist railed against
any student "right to receive,"" which Justice Rehnquist characterized
as "a curious entitlement" that Justice Brennan had "fashion[ed] out of
whole cloth."36 In his assault on Justice Brennan's opinion, Justice
Rehnquist pointed out that the selection-removal distinction "makes little
sense" if one's goal is to avert the suppression of ideas, and that
"educational suitability" or "pervasive vulgarity" are
"determinations... based as much on the content of the book as
determinations that the book espouses pernicious political views." '369
Perhaps significantly, only three of the Justices then on the Court remain
there today-Stevens, O'Connor, and now-Chief Justice Rehnquist-
and the political balance has drifted toward favoring the Pico
dissenters.370
Pico's vague plurality is not the only factor that makes Pico difficult
to decipher and apply today. That the case arose in a high school library
muddies the extent to which the plurality's statements about teen rights,
or the extent to which the dissenters' contrary statements, can be
analogized to adult patrons in a public library. Rendering the case even
less readily adaptable as precedent, the plurality holding can be read
strictly to establish the impermissibility only of viewpoint discrimination
in the high school library, the narrow ground on which Justice Blackmun
decided the case. Thus, it remains unsettled to what extent Pico dicta can
be fairly interpreted to import public forum analysis into library law.
Pico leaves in its wake another troublesome question that becomes
important in applying the decision today: What about book selection?
Justice Brennan was careful to limit the plurality opinion to removal.37
Selection poses a particular evidentiary problem: if officials' intentions
were dispositive, a court would be hard pressed to look inside the minds
of librarians to determine why they acquired one book as opposed to
another.372 With all the books from which librarians have to choose, they
367. Pico, 457 U.S. at 895 (Powell, J., dissenting).
368. Id. at 910 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist also asserted that, due to Justice
White's refusal to address the constitutional issues in Pico, the Court should have dismissed the writ
of certiorari as improvidently granted. Id. at 904 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See generally
PETER IRONS, BRENNAN VS. REHNQUIST 180-82 (1994) ("Justice Rehnquist did not conceal his
scorn for Brennan's effort to constitutionalize a 'right to read."').
369. Pico, 457 U.S. at 916-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
370. See generally TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION
267-69 (2000).
371. Pico, 457 U.S. at 862.
372. See Nadel, supra note 32, at 1124.
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can readily offer space and financial constraints as innocuous viewpoint-
neutral, even content-neutral, explanations for their decisions.373 But if
Pico is to be fit into the public forum rubric, then is Justice Rehnquist
correct that acquisition and removal must be subject to the same
standard?374 However difficult to prove improperly-discriminating
selection,375 the door must be open for the claim, 376 at least with regard to
viewpoint discrimination. 3
Moreover, if the library is in any sense a traditional or limited public
forum, then even viewpoint-neutral but content-based selection decisions
must be justified, such as the decision to acquire books about space
exploration rather than about geology. Such inherently content-based
selection decisions do not preclude libraries' classification as public
forums. It might be that the shelf-space and financial constraints create a
compelling state interest in a content-based selection process that, when
conducted by professional librarians, satisfies strict scrutiny. It might
also be that the strict scrutiny-standard may be adapted to the special
needs of a library, as Tinker can be understood to have adapted the
standard to schools.
While Pico seems to create as many questions as it answers, it
nevertheless represents the best there is in the Supreme Court
373. See, e.g., id. (explaining that some librarians failed to acquire Madonna's explicit book, Sex
(1992), purportedly not because of its content, but because the book's metal cover and spiral
binding would be too difficult to maintain on library shelves); see also PECK, supra note 355, at 53
(describing libraries' Sex dilemma).
374. See, e.g., Nadel, supra note 32, at 1123 & n.27.
375. Id. (positing discriminatory impact as a means to prove viewpoint-discriminatory selection);
id. at 1126 (positing for proof of viewpoint discrimination, a "threshold... based on the likely
ability of the court to resolve the dispute... such as evidence of the discriminator's intent").
376. Nadel analogizes the Court's reluctance to entangle itself in public broadcasting editorial
judgments, Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673-76 (1998), to a likely
reluctance to involve itself in public library selection decisions. Nadel, supra note 32, at 1125-26.
While that analogy is well-founded in the Court's preference against usurpation of local prerogative,
see, e.g., Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988), the result would be
unfortunately inconsistent with libraries' historical importance in public receipt of expression, see
Bell, supra note 318, at 221. Forbes presented the special problem of a public trustee in a
traditionally regulated-medium. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 672-73. The Court would hardly point to
local prerogative as reason to refrain from applying its precedents in a case of censorship on a city
street. See, e.g., Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 137 (1992) (striking
local licensing ordinance for excessive discretion in regulating parades); see also Pico, 457 U.S. at
866 (plurality holding that book removal "directly and sharply implicate[s]" "basic constitutional
values" (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
377. See infra Part IV.E (distinguishing selection challenges from removal challenges).
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jurisprudence of library law. Absent further guidance from the Court, the
lower courts have resorted to the analytical tools at their disposal. If high
school students enjoy a right to receive in their libraries, where rights
presumably are more circumscribed than in the adult community, then
one can infer a corresponding right for adult patrons of the general
public library.378 And if viewpoint discrimination is prohibited in the
high school library, where rights are presumably more circumscribed
than in the adult community, then one can infer that public forum
analysis applies to patron access to the general public library.379 Thus,
Internet filtering in whatever sort of library and for whatever age of
patron must be held up to a Pico looking-glass.
2. In the Internet Era: Mainstream Loudoun
Despite the tradition of free access to materials in public libraries,
many libraries succumbed to pressure from patrons and government
officials to install filters. In 1998, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia applied Pico to the problem of Internet
filtering in the public library. 8° Public libraries in Loudoun County,
Virginia, required all patrons accessing the Internet to use terminals
equipped with X-Stop, a filtering software package.38' The librarians'
aim, according to their AUP, was to block patron access to obscenity,
child pornography, and material harmful to juveniles.382 Patrons who
believed websites were improperly blocked by X-Stop could petition
librarians to unblock specified sites. 83 It was undisputed that X-Stop had
erroneously blocked patrons' access to sites without content that was
illegal or harmful to minors, such as The Safer Sex Page, the Books for
Gay and Lesbian Teens/Youth page, and the Renaissance Transgender
378. See, eg., Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1253-55
(3d Cir. 1992).
379. See, e.g., id. at 1255-56.
380. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 792
(E.D. Va. 1998) (Mainstream Loudoun 1). See generally Geraldine Rosales, Note, Mainstream
Loudoun and the Future of Internet Filtering for America's Public Libraries, 26 RUTGERS COMP.
& TECH. L.J. 357 (2000); Semitsu, supra note 16, at 520; Julia M. Tedjeske, Note, Mainstream
Loudoun andAccess to Internet Resources in Public Libraries, 60 U. Prrr. L REv. 1265 (1999).
381. Mainstream Loudon 1, 2 F. Supp. 2d. at 787.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 797.
449
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384Association page. Under § 1983, the plaintiff patrons alleged a
violation of their "right to access protected speech on the Internet.
385
Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County
Library consists of two detailed opinions on pretrial motions to dismiss
and for summary judgment; in both, U.S. District Judge Brinkema-who
holds a master's degree in library science from Rutgers University 6-
reached several critical conclusions in the plaintiffs' favor. Despite its
limitations, the parties agreed that Pico was "the most analogous
authority on [the First Amendment] issue. 3 7 However, the parties
disagreed over whether filtering was a library selection or a library
removal .3" The library argued that Internet filtering is a selection
decision, thus escaping Pico; the library even asserted a right to
viewpoint discrimination in selection decisions. 3 9  Defendants
analogized the Internet to an inter-library loan system, in which patrons
request material, in this case websites, from other libraries;390 those
materials are thereby subject to the library's selection standards. The
patrons argued that Internet filtering was a library removal decision, thus
controlled by the Pico plurality decision.39 In plaintiffs' view, the
library acquires the Internet like it acquires "a set of encyclopedias," and
blocking a website is like blacking out an undesirable article with a
magic marker.392 The court agreed with the patrons, bringing Pico to
bear on X-Stop.
The court was thus required to adapt Pico to, or "retrofit" Pico with,
modem public forum analysis.393 Defendants contended that the public
library is a nonpublic forum, while patrons contended that the public
library is a limited public forum.394 The court agreed with the patrons,
384. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552,
556 & n.2 (E.D. Va. 1998) (Mainstream Loudoun II).
385. Mainstream Loudoun 1, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 787.
386. 1 ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 2002,4th Circuit 55 (2002).
387. Mainstream Loudoun 1, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 792.
388. Id. at 793.
389. Id. at 794.
390. Id. at 793.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. See supra part III.B.1.
394. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. Of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552,
561-62 (E.D. Va. 1998) (Mainstream Loundoun 11).
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thus consigning X-Stop, an inherently content-based mechanism, to strict
scrutiny,"' a much higher hurdle than the simple ban on viewpoint
discrimination that appears on the face of Pico. The court reached its
"limited public forum" determination in reliance on a Third Circuit
decision, Kreimer v. Bureau of Polie. 9 6
Yet another important decision in library law that had nothing to do
with the library collection, Kreimer upheld library rules that resulted in
the homeless plaintiff's repeated expulsion from the library." 7
Significantly, the Kreimer court ruled that the public library was a
limited public forum, after ample consideration of three factors:
government intent for the forum, extent of public use of the forum, and
the nature of the forum and its compatibility with free expression." 8
Judge Brinkema conducted a similar analysis with the same result. 9 On
the first point, the government is not obliged to open a public library, but
does so by choice; that choice demonstrates a government intent to
create a forum for public communication.4"' On the second point, the
government opens the public library for area residents to come and go,
using the library as they please; that open-door policy points to a public
forum.4' Finally, the Kreimer court cited Brown for the proposition that
a library's "very purpose is to aid in the acquisition of knowledge
through reading, writing and quiet contemplation. 40
2
Under the court's construction of strict scrutiny, the library would
have to demonstrate that X-Stop (1) served compelling state interests;
(2) was necessary to serve those interests; and (3) was a narrowly drawn
means to serve those interests.0 3 On the first prong of strict scrutiny, the
library asserted as compelling interests "minimizing access to illegal
pornography; and avoidance of creation of a sexually hostile
environment."' Though the patrons challenged whether those interests
395. Id. at 563.
396. 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992).
397. Id. at 1246.
398. Id. at 1259-62.
399. Mainstream Loudoun 11, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 562-63.
400. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1259.
401. Id. at 1260.
402. Id. at 1261.
403. Mainstream Loudoun HI, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 564-65. This is a demanding formulation of
strict scrutiny, which is typically formulated as only a two-prong test without a distinct inquiry into
necessity. E.g., SMOLLA, supra note 232, § 3.0311][a], at 3-82.
404. Mainstream Loudoun 1, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 564.
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were the library's true motivations, the patrons did not deny their
compelling nature.4"5 The court therefore assumed that compelling state
interests were at stake.
406
But the court could find neither necessity for X-Stop nor narrow
tailoring in its methodology. Filtering advocate David Burt was unable
to persuade the court of necessity, pointing to only four incidents
nationwide in which minors' access to pornography created a problem,
and to no librarian complaints of a hostile work environment. 47 As to
narrow tailoring, patrons contended that AUPs, privacy screens, terminal
placement, patron education, time limits, filters for minors only, and
criminal law enforcement offered less restrictive alternatives to X-
Stop.408 The court agreed that privacy screens, casual monitoring, and
filters for minors only offered less restrictive alternatives, though
expressly declined to decide whether those solutions "would necessarily
be constitutional if implemented.
4 9
The court was more troubled by X-Stop as an overbroad mechanism
and as a prior restraint. The court commented negatively on over-
inclusiveness, or the sandbox effect, in that X-Stop reduced adult
patrons to only material fit for children.4"0 The court also commented on
over-inclusiveness in that the filter blocked constitutionally-protected,
non-obscene adult content.41 ' The court further identified an
impermissible prior restraint arising from (1) the libraries' delegation of
blocking determinations to a private vendor with secret criteria; (2) the
chilling effect created by the unblocking procedure; and (3) the lack of
procedural safeguards, such as expeditious judicial review, in the
unblocking process. 412 The imposition of filtering between patron and
content is akin to a licensing scheme that impedes free expression, and
405. Id. at 565.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 565-66. A hostile work environment claim has since been filed. See supra notes 17,
19.
408. Mainstream Loudoun 11, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 566.
409. Id. at 567.
410. Id. at 567-68.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 569-70 & n.22. Delegation, especially to a private entity using secret criteria, runs
afoul of the Constitution because it creates a risk of viewpoint discrimination. See Nadel, supra note
32, at 1147-50.
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filters' near arbitrariness is akin to impermissibly broad government
discretion in the granting of licenses.4"3
The Loudoun County library system did not appeal. The library board
subsequently adopted a new Internet policy that does not restrict adult
access to the Internet, but restricts minors to use only filtered access
unless parents say otherwise.4"4
IV. THE LAW OF INTERNET FILTERING TO COME
The Loudoun County Library chose not to appeal its loss in the
Eastern District of Virginia, but the all-patron filtering question will
probably reach the Supreme Court in the CIPA cases-which involve the
right to receive Internet content in public libraries-notwithstanding any
pertinent dicta that might appear in the COPA case-which involves the
right to disseminate content on the Internet. To solve the CIPA problem,
the Court will have to face the questions that confronted Judge Brinkema
in Mainstream Loudoun. Is Pico controlling law? If Pico controls, is
filtering selection or removal? Does it matter? Does public forum
analysis pertain? If so, is the public library a limited public forum? If the
library is a limited public forum, is filtering narrowly drawn? In any
event, is filtering a prior restraint?
While the Pico foundation is shaky, the validity of that precedent
might not matter at all to the resolution of the CIPA cases. Recall Judge
Brinkema's reasoning: She identified Pico as controlling precedent, she
asked whether filtering is removal or selection, then she proceeded under
"removal" to apply public forum analysis. But Pico predates public
forum analysis. Only by looking to Pico's focus on viewpoint
discrimination and reliance on Tinker can we squeeze Pico into the
public forum pantheon.4"' If Pico is not controlling precedent, or if
filtering is selection, then we are "outside Pico." The Supreme Court's
dominant mode of analysis whenever private persons exercise First
Amendment rights on public property is now public forum analysis.416 In
Mainstream Loudoun and the CIPA cases, patrons are exercising their
First Amendment right to receive information and ideas on public
413. See id. at 568.
414. See LOUDOUN COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRARY INTERNET POLICY (adopted Dec. 1, 1998),
previously at http.//censorware.netIlegal/loudoun/981201,intemetpol_.cpl.html (last visited July 21,
2001).
415. See infra Part IV.B.1.
416. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45-46 (1983).
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property, the public library computers. In the end, it probably makes no
difference whether Pico is good law and whether filtering is selection or
removal.
The viability and applicability of Pico is discussed at greater length in
Part IV.B and is raised here only to demonstrate the likelihood that
public forum analysis will likely be brought to bear in the CIPA cases in
any event. Part IV.C demonstrates that once public forum analysis is
brought to bear, Mainstream Loudoun correctly determined that the
library collection must be a public forum; indeed, arguably, the library
should be classified a traditional public forum. Part LV.D demonstrates
that under the strict scrutiny inquiry of public forum analysis,
Mainstream Loudoun correctly ruled that filters are overbroad because
they are not narrowly drawn, and thus they necessarily fail strict
scrutiny.
This series of conclusions from Mainstream Loudoun raises a
potential flaw in the analysis, which filtering proponents exploit. If the
library collection is a public forum, then should not public forum
doctrine apply to selection as well as removal? Justice Rehnquist in Pico
rejected any rational distinction between selection and removal," 7 and in
truth, the Internet could be construed either way. If public forum analysis
bears on library selection, an inherently content-based process, then
strict scrutiny pertains. Filtering proponents argue that library selection
cannot pass strict scrutiny. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the
selection of books about entomology instead of etymology, or spiders
instead of ants, or Jack Kerouac instead of Tom Wolfe, could be
narrowly drawn solutions, even assuming that overcoming financial and
space constraints are compelling state interests. Because it is so difficult
to thread library selection through strict scrutiny, filtering proponents
conclude that the court in Mainstream Loudoun erred. The proponents
argue that libraries must be nonpublic forums for selection purposes, and
maybe for removal purposes too; i.e., libraries must be nonpublic forums
when they filter the Internet. Under the lenient nonpublic forum analysis,
filters' overbreadth becomes less problematic, and filters become more
likely to pass constitutional muster.
417. Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 916-17 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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This problem may be termed "the selection paradox," and it is
explored in depth in Part IV.E. Though intriguing, the problem proves to
be a myth.
Though ignoring the selection paradox, Mainstream Loudoun ruled
that filtering is an impermissible prior restraint on First Amendment
activity. That ruling pertains regardless of whether the selection paradox
can be resolved," 8 and Part IV.F demonstrates that the ruling is correct.
A. Pico and the Applicability of Forum Analysis
For lack of other authority, lower courts today struggle with fractured
Pico when they face questions of a library patron's First Amendment
rights. But two Pico voices that endure on the Court today are those of
dissenting Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, in whose direction Court
politics have shifted in the intervening twenty years.419 Thus one may
doubt that the Court will show great deference to the plurality reasoning
in Pico. The Court could approach the library problem anew and
distinguish Pico as a school-law case. Moreover, the Court could
approach library management as a question of government speech rather
than as a question of patron rights. Fortunately, the Court will not likely
adopt these "outside Pico" approaches, for these approaches would be
ill-advised.
Granted, the dissenting opinions in Pico from Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor focused on the educational mission of schools and the
immature First Amendment rights of minors.42 0 But dissenting Chief
Justice Burger, joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Powell,
observed that the books removed from the school library were available
to students in the public library.4 1 That observation suggests that the
same censorship the dissenters would have approved in Pico might be
found problematic in a public library, even as to minor patrons. The Pico
dissenters did not utterly refute a right to receive, and indeed did not
speak to a minor's First Amendment rights wholly outside the school
418. One cannot seriously contend that ordinary selection processes constitute a prior restraint.
Nadel, supra note 32, at 1130.
419. See YARBROUGH, supra note 370, at 267-69. Justice Stevens, who concurred fully in the
Pico plurality vAth Justices Brennan and Marshall, is today one of the Court's most senior Justices.
But the Court has not moved in their leftvard direction.
420. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 913-15 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 921 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
421. Id. at 886 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
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setting, especially in a forum where parents can directly supervise their
children. Indeed, it would be irrational to limit Pico to school law and
then allow filtering as to adult patrons in the public library. Children in
the public school would then have broader First Amendment rights than
adults in the public library. That strange inconsistency would leave Pico
in such a cloud of uncertainty as to render its plurality effectively
overruled. Shaken free from its perch in the public forum doctrine, Pico
would crash to the ground and likely take Tinker with it. For once it is
proven that Pico was improperly retrofit with public forum doctrine, one
can no longer be certain that Tinker has any place in the public forum
pantheon. Tinker might be reduced from a constitutional staple, a
building block of Pico, to historical anomaly, an intemperate extension
of children's rights amid the fervor of the civil rights era. One might
hope that the Court is too judicious with its power to leave school law in
such disarray.
The greater threat to Pico viability today is that the Court, per Chief
Justice Rehnquist, would view the public library collection through the
lens of government speech rather than the lens of citizen rights.4" Under
the "government as speaker"4" doctrine, public library computers would
be the product of a federal subsidy program, rather than of a federal
regulatory program."' The full force of public forum doctrine can come
to bear only in case of a federal regulatory program.4" Under a federal
subsidy program, the government itself is the speaker and "may
indirectly abridge speech" 26 as long as the program does not "aim[] at
the suppression of dangerous ideas. 427 A subsidy conception is signaled
422. E.g., NADEL, supra note 32, at 1135 ("[C]ivil libertarians would better direct their resources
to emphasizing that [library] selections cannot be treated as government speech, [which] would
permit viewpoint discrimination."). "[T]here seems little danger that even Justice Rehnquist would
permit municipalities to exercise [such] discretion .... Yet as public libraries begin to assume new
roles the issue of treating them as government speech might arise more forcefully." Id.; see also,
e.g., Brent L VanNorman, Comment, The Library Internet Filter: On the Computer or in the
Child?, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 425, 437-38 (1998-1999). For discussion of Justice Rehnquist's
Pico opinion as a precursor to government speech doctrine, see Randall P. Bezanson & William G.
Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1414-15 (2001).
423. E.g., NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 610 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting).
424. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 552 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
425. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
426. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
427. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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by cases such as Rust v. Sullivan,42 8 in which Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, approved limited viewpoint-based restrictions on
the speech of government-funded doctors, 429 and NEA v. Finley, in which
the Court distinguished subsidies for the arts from situations when
"direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty [is] at stake., 43' Recall
that Justice Rehnquist in Pico analogized "government as educator" to
"government as employer [or] property owner"; 431' he might conclude
that government as librarian fits the analogy as well. An exegesis on the
folly of reconciling the government-as-speaker doctrine-a resurrection
of the right-privilege doctrine 432-- with traditional First Amendment
analysis exceeds the scope of this Article.433 Suffice it to say that the
dispute engendered by this dichotomy rages on in the Court today. A
2001 decision, Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,434 limited the reach of
the Rust/subsidy conception.435  Faced with a viewpoint-based
government restriction on public support for legal services, the Court
relied on the forum analysis of Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of
University of Virginia436 rather than the subsidy analysis of Rust.437 The
Court distinguished the expenditure of public money to facilitate private
speech from money expended to support the government's own
message.438 Predictably, the Chief Justice in Velazquez joined Justices
O'Connor, Thomas, and Scalia in the latter's dissent.439
Comparing Finley-Rust subsidy analysis with Velazquez-Rosenberger
forum analysis, deciding which today would apply to the public library
under CIPA's e-rate/LMLS funding scheme becomes more a question of
political ideology than of objective inquiry. Under subsidy analysis, the
government enjoys almost limitless discretion, even, effectively, to
428. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
429. Id. at 192-93.
430. Finley, 524 U.S. at 587-88.
431. Bd. ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 920 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
432. See JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FlRST AMENDMENT LAW IN A NUTSHELL 351
(2d ed. 2000).
433. See id. at 348-66.
434. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
435. Id. at 540-49.
436. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
437. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 540-43 (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833-34).
438. Id. at 542.
439. See Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 549.
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engage in viewpoint discrimination." Meanwhile, forum analysis
triggers substantial constitutional protections. In Finley, Justice Scalia,
concurring, and Justice Souter, dissenting, disagreed sharply over
whether Rust or Rosenberger was the proper model." Justice Souter
was prepared to distinguish Rust from Rosenberger based on a sensible
distinction "between government-as-buyer or -speaker and government-
as-regulator-of-private-speech."" 2  In Rust, Congress used private
speakers to express information about a government program, while in
Rosenberger the government interest was in furthering private
expression per se." 3 But Justice Scalia showed no allegiance to such a
distinction. Instead he would permit government-as-speaker discretion
even when government plays favorites among private speakers by
funding those with government-friendly viewpoints.4" Justice Scalia
would strictly construe the First Amendment and limit government
discretion only when it affirmatively suppresses speech."
Fortunately for libraries, the more recent Velazquez decision invoked
Justice Souter's distinction, suggesting the propriety of forum
analysis." 6 The Court in Velazquez decided that Congress's conditional
funding of the Legal Services Corporation constituted the facilitation of
private speech, 447 contrary to the dissenters' view of the funding as a
subsidy for government's own speech. 448  The Court invoked
Rosenberger, which involved student publication funding at the
University of Virginia." 9 In Rosenberger, the university intended to
facilitate students' own private expression;45 similarly in Velazquez, the
440. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) ("[T]he Government has not discriminated
on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other."),
quoted in NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569,588 (1998).
441. Compare Finley, 524 U.S. at 598-99 (Scalia, J., concurring), with id. at 610-15 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
442. Id. at 612 (Souter, J., dissenting).
443. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (citing
Rust, 500 U.S. at 194), quoted in Finley, 524 U.S. at 612 n.7 (Souter, J., dissenting).
444. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., concurring).
445. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., concurring).
446. ALA Compl., supra note 11, T 4 (quoting Pico, 457 U.S. at 915 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
447. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001).
448. Id. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
449. Id. at 541 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833
(1995)).
450. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834, cited in Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542.
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government through the Legal Services Corporation provided funding
for private attorneys to represent the views of their private clients. 5
The public library falls squarely in the Velazquez-Rosenberger camp.
The very mission of the public library, historically, is "freewheeling
inquiry," to quote Justice Rhenquist's own word in Pico.45 2 Where the
government in Rosenburger sought to facilitate classic free expression,
the public library seeks to facilitate the First Amendment right to receive
information and expression. The public library buys computers to foster
First Amendment activity, both from the point of view of the content
author and from the point of view of the library patron. Unlike the
clinicians in Rust, public library computers are not intended to carry any
government message;4 rather, public libraries acquire Internet access to
facilitate private expression per se. Thus government-as-speaker doctrine
is not the appropriate mode of analysis.454
Thus, the positions advocated by the vigorous Pico dissenters do no
harm to the Mainstream Loudoun analysis. Pico is properly analogized
to the modem public library case, and any distinction based on Pico as a
school-law decision cannot accord with inferior rights for adults in the
public library. Moreover, the problem of patron access should lead the
courts invariably to public forum doctrine, not government-as-speaker
doctrine, regardless of Pico.
B. The Library as a Limited Public Forum Rather Than a Nonpublic
Forum
When forum analysis is brought to bear, whether filtering is selection
or removal, the nature of the library collection, including Internet access,
must be determined. The Third Circuit previously determined in Kreimer
that the library as a physical space is a limited public forum,455 and the
451. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 542.
452. Pico, 457 U.S. at 915.
453. See NADEL, supra note 32, at 1135 ("The viewpoint-based discrimination permitted for
government speech should only be acceptable from entities that are created to serve the political
purposes of elected officials attempting to implement their policies. Entities that were expressly
created and historically operated for nonpartisan purposes, like public libraries,... do not fall
within this realm.").
454. It is not clear whether under Justice Scalia's strict interpretation of the First Amendment,
the government might be able to use CIPA's e-rate/IMLS scheme to manipulate library content. But
even Justice Scalia should be concerned that the government's intent under CIPA is not to promote
any message at all, rather to suppress broad classes of content and possibly to suppress viewpoints.
455. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1261 (3d Cir. 1992).
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court in Mainstream Loudoun extended that ruling to the library
collection.456 Critics of Mainstream Loudoun would have the public
library be a non-public forum, either as a result of its own declaration,"'
or as a result of a corrected application of Kreimer.455 Attorney Mark
Nadel in particular argues that Mainstream Loudoun erred in applying
Kreimer, and that Kreimer is inapplicable.459
In Nadel's conception of the library, librarians act in one capacity
when deciding what patrons may enter the library, and a different
capacity when deciding what content to add to the library collection.460
The Third Circuit in Kreimer, which concerned a homeless man's access
to the library, ruled the library a limited public forum.46 ' But Nadel
contends that the Mainstream Loudoun court erroneously extended that
ruling to the library's collection, "fail[ing] to acknowledge that the First
Amendment often applies differently to the different aspects of a
multidimensional medium like a library. 462 A public library, Nadel then
argues, is a nonpublic forum because it does "no more than reserve
eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose
members must then, as individuals, 'obtain permission' to use it."'463
Nadel is partly right; the library is in some sense a "multidimensional
medium." But it does not necessarily follow that the library collection is
a nonpublic forum. The public library, like many public facilities,
contains multiple forums. The library floor is a limited public forum, as
in Kreimer. The library director's office is a nonpublic forum. That
access to a forum is limited to a class of persons does not necessarily
make the forum nonpublic.4' The staff break room in the library might
456. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 562-63 (E.D. Va.
1998) (Mainstream Loundoun I1).
457. NATIONAL LAW CENTER FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT
OF NLC PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNET USE POLICY FOR LIBRARIES 2-3 (2000), at http:/-
www.nationallaweenter.org/NLC%20Library%20Intemet%2Policy%/20and%2OMemo%203-15-
00.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2002) [hereinafter NLC PROPOSAL MEMORANDUM].
458. VANNoRMAN, supra note 222, at 431-32 & n.55.
459. NADEL, supra note 32, at 1133 & n.81.
460. Id. at 1132.
461. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1261.
462. NADEL, supra note 32, at 1133.
463. Id. at 1134 (quoting Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679-80
(1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also NLC LEGAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 19, at
21 (asserting that libraries are nonpublic forums because they require patrons to have library cards
to make full use of library services).
464. See, e.g., Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 353 (6th Cir. 2001) (Kincaid11).
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be a nonpublic forum, but there might be a bulletin board in the break
room designated as a "free speech zone" for employees: a limited public
forum open to a selected class.
A three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit erred in its forum analysis, on
the question of limited access, in Kincaid v. Gibson.465 Kincaid arose
from a battle between student editors and university administrators for
control of university yearbook content. The Sixth Circuit en bane
ultimately concluded that the university yearbook was a limited public
forum as to student editors, even though the editors were selected and
had to meet objective academic criteria, and even though the audience
was the limited class of university students.466 The court quoted the
Supreme Court in Arkansas Educational Television Commission v.
Forbes,467 explaining the difference between "general access," as in a
limited public forum, and "selective access," as in a nonpublic forum.468
General access is defined as the situation in which the government
"makes its property generally available to a certain class of
speakers.".... Selective access occurs when the government
"does no more than reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a
particular class of speakers, whose members must then, as
individuals, 'obtain permission' to use it."46
9
Forbes was on its face a special case. The Supreme Court warned
against "the public forum doctrine [being] extended in a mechanical way
to [a] very different context." '47 Notwithstanding the unique nature of
the regulated broadcast medium, the Court in Forbes treated a public
broadcast station like a nonpublic forum as to political candidates
wanting to participate in a program designed by station producers.471
Candidates did not have a presumptive right to appear on the program;
even though the program was open to political candidates, producers
retained discretion to decide which ones, based on their likelihood of
success in the election.472
465. 191 F.3d 719 (6th Cir. 1999) (Kincaid 1), rev'd en banc, Kincaid II, 236 F.3d 342.
466. Kincaid II, 236 F.3d at 349 n.9.
467. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
468. Id. 353.
469. Id. (quoting Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679, omitting citations and adding emphasis).
470. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 672-73.
471. Id. at 676-83.
472. Id. at 680-83.
Washington Law Review
Were the public library truly a case of would-be speech receivers
having to "obtain permission" in each instance to access the collection,
or even to access the library computers, then Nadel would be right, and
the library would be a nonpublic forum. But that is not the case. Anyone
may walk into a public library and browse the shelves.4 73 Resource
check-out and computer use might be limited to residents of the district
the library serves, and in that sense, those services are "generally
available to a certain class" of receivers.474 Typically any teen or adult in
that class has a presumptive right to obtain a library card. Persons who
violate library policies might have their cards revoked, removing them
from the class, like student editors might be removed from office
because falling grades violate the policies that define the class. But the
library card serves only to preserve the orderly maintenance of the
collection by ensuring that patrons, the speakers/receivers, are and
remain legitimate members of the class. Giving patrons library cards is
thus like giving student editors keys to the yearbook office. Giving
patrons computer access passwords to receive Internet expression
through the library network is like giving student editors computer
passwords to produce yearbook expression through the campus network.
That modest access restriction does not alter the nature of the forum, but
merely promotes its orderly use. In employing that modest restriction,
the public librarian does not retain discretion to choose which patrons
may use the collection and cannot employ content-based use restrictions
by peering over patrons' shoulders or sifting through patrons' check-out
records. In contrast, the public television producer does retain discretion
to choose which candidates appear in a debate and does base that
decision on whether the candidate's message has garnered popular
support.
475
473. See, e.g., Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1260 (3d
Cir. 1992).
474. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679.
475. One reason Forbes might make a more appealing analog to the filtering case than Kincaid is
that the complaining would-be speaker in Forbes and the filtering case is a person outside the
government workplace, a member of the general public-the candidate and the library patron
respectively-rather than the designated government editor, producer, or librarian, as in Kincaid.
But that similarity/dissimilarity has no legal significance as long as the forum is analyzed from the
complainant's perspective. In fact, the general-public analogue, a university student, was also a
plaintiff in Kincaid, asserting his First Amendment right to receive. Kindcaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d
342, 353 n.15 (6th Cir. 2001) (Kincaid I1). The yearbook appeared as a limited public forum both
from his perspective as a complaining would-be receiver and from the editor's perspective of would-
be speaker. See id.; see also BELL, supra note 318, at 205-06 (observing that public forum cases are
462
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The library collection is at least a limited public forum and arguably a
traditional public forum. Even if Kreimer is distinguishable as a case
about "the library-as-shelter" rather than "the library-as-collection," it
would be absurd to conclude that the library-as-shelter is a limited public
forum,\while concluding that the library-as-collection is something less.
The library collection is a repository for information and ideas, including
those at the core of First Amendment protection. Professor Bernard Bell
describes libraries as "the archetypal traditional government-funded loci
for acquiring knowledge.""76 Their history can be traced to the mid-
1800s, if not to Benjamin Franklin's subscription library of the late
eighteenth century.4" If the library as a whole is the quintessential locus
of the right to receive, the patron and the collection are the quintessential
receiver and received. Thus from the perspective of the patron,478 the
library collection arguably meets the historical-significance test for the
traditional public forum: a place "that has as 'a principal purpose... the
free exchange of ideas ' ' 479 if not "immemorially... held in trust for the
use of the public... for... communicating thoughts between
citizens. 4t4 Granted, the Supreme Court consistently refers to the public
street or park as the archetypal traditional public forum for affirmative
expression.48' But nothing about free speech's companion right to
receive suggests that it, too, should not have an archetype in the
traditional public forum genre, and libraries fit the bill. To accord library
patrons inferior First Amendment rights vis-A-vis the library-as-
collection, relative to a homeless man's rights vis-A-vis the library-as-
shelter, abandons common sense.
Nadel contends that even if Kreimer controls, the Mainstream
Loudoun court mishandled the three-factor inquiry-government intent
for the forum, extent of public use of the forum, and inherent nature of
typically brought by the speaker, not the audience, but that the forum should be classified according
to the proper perspective).
476. BELL, supra note 318, at 221.
477. Id. at 220. "Public libraries in their modem form started in the mid-1800s and developed
from a vide variety of privately run libraries and collections." Id. at n.162.
478. See id. at 205-06 (observing that public forum cases are typically brought by the speaker,
not the audience, but that the forum should be classified according to the proper perspective).
479. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 679 (1992) (quoting
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)).
480. Id. (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)); see also ALA,
LIDRARiEs: AN AMERICAN VALUE (1999) ("Libraries are a legacy to each generation... ), at
http'/wjA,.ala.org/alaorgtoifibval.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002).
481. See, eg., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672-73 (1998).
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the forum-to determine whether the Loudoun County libraries were
limited public forums or nonpublic forums.482 His objections on all three
elements are rooted in a common theme: the librarians' discretion in
book selection. With respect to intent, he complains that libraries do not
collect "'all' content," that a "library would [not likely] accept all
donations. 483 With respect to use, he shifts focus off actual patron use
and reasserts that libraries are "selective" and "'do not contain every
book published.' 484 With respect to nature, Nadel again opines that
libraries are "discerning, not indiscriminate, collectors of content.
485
But librarians' intentional selectivity reflects money and space
constraints, not government intent for, use of, and nature of the forum.
Nadel presumes that were a librarian offered, say, all content cataloged
in Books in Print, and money and space were of no consequence, the
librarian would say "no." Hardly. What librarian would not like to have
the collection and resources of the Library of Congress under his roof?
What community would not want the collection and resources of the
Library of Congress around the corner? Libraries have developed the
inter-library loan system, which gives every patron in a participating
library system access to the collections of every other library in the
system-a simulation of a collection without horizon. But the real thing,
a Library of Congress in every town, has been a dream. It was
impossible to conceive of a mechanism that could make the dream
reality-before the Internet. Now the Internet shows how a Library of
Congress in every town might one day be possible. For now, intellectual
property law and fear of piracy keeps books in print, where copies can
be controlled better. In time, though, computers in the library might
come to outnumber bookshelves. And with Internet connectivity,
libraries surely will share access to these electronic resources.
Once a library establishes Internet connectivity, additional web
content poses no problem of time or space; finite computer resources can
be allocated with content-neutral measures such as time limits.486 Nadel
482. NADEL, supra note 32, at 1133 n.81.
483. Id.; see also NLC LEGAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 19, at 21.
484. NADEL, supra note 32, at 1133 n.81 (quoting Brooklyn Inst. of Arts & Scis. v. City of New
York, 64 F. Supp. 2d 184,203 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)).
485. Id.
486. Nadel disagreed with Mainstream Loudoun's conclusion that additional web content is cost-
free, analogizing budget constraints on book selection to budget constraints on computer hardware
purchase, and to patrons' inability to use computers monopolized by other patrons "for disfavored
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suggests that a library would not accept all donations, and that, by its
nature, the collection is selective, finite. But this selectivity turns on
physical space limitations and cataloging resources. Internet access is, in
essence, the donor of everything, at no cost of additional space or
resources.487 Librarianship, after all, is about helping people access and
sift information and ideas; librarianship, ideally, is not about deciding
what information people may access and what they may not.48
Thus, the Mainstream Loudoun court correctly concluded, in
analyzing government intent, that when the library's mission statement
endorsed access to "all avenues of ideas,' 48 9 it meant all.490 Mainstream
Loudoun correctly focused on patrons' use of the library as receivers,49'
not book authors' role in the library as speakers. Both patrons and
uses." Id. at 1128-29. But first, Mainstream Loudoun did not utterly disregard the cost of Internet
connectivity. A library need not "select" the Internet at all, but once Internet connectivity is
established there is no additional cost for additional web content. Second, Nadel conflated
"websites advertised as XXX" with non-research-oriented protocols such as chat, concluding that
"the First Amendment should not forbid libraries" from blocking either. Id. at 1129. But see id. at
1130-31 (suggesting that AUPs are preferable to filters, thbugh invite litigation). Admittedly the
line can be thin between the government restriction that defines the bounds of a limited public
forum and the restriction that discriminates between content within that forum. But while protocol
differentiation comfortably defines a forum boundary, differentiation between lawful sexual content
and, say, Westlaw.com is exactly the sort of value-laden judgment that the First Amendment forbids
government to make in a limited public forum. If patron monopolization of computer terminals is a
problem, then the solution necessarily lies in content-neutral AUP rules such as time limits, not
schemes to assess the relative social worth of patrons' online explorations. Should a reference
librarian favor an adult's question about radon over an earlier received question from a teen about
lesbianism? Can we differentiate between entertainment (Discovery Canada's The Sex Files? See
Brenda Bouw, Discovery Takes the Sex Files Further into the Night, NAT'L POST, Dec. 14, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 30651989) and information (Pulitzer Prize-winning Wit? See Deborah
Martin, Play Has Powerful Punch; 'Wit' Opens at Magik Theater, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
July 6, 2001, available at 2001 WL 22459751)?
487. Sarah E. Warren, Filtering Sexual Material on the Internet: Public Libraries Surf the Legal
Morass, FLA. BAR J., Oct. 1999, at 52.
488. Cf. NADEL, supra note 32, at 1137 (describing the role of librarians to "find the most
suitable version of the information they seek quickly and easily," though confusing librarians with
journalists, who exclude the non-newsworthy from coverage). See generally ALA, CODE OF ETICS
OF THE ALA, at http://www.ala.orglalaorgoifethics.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002).
489. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 563
(E.D. Va. 1998) (Mainstream Loundoun 1I), quoted in NADEL, supra note 32, at 1133 n.81.
490. The NLC has proposed an AUP that on its face reserves Internet acces terminals as a
nonpublic forum. NLC MEMORANDUM, supra note 457, at 2-3; see NLC, NLC PROPOSAL FOR AN
ITERNET USE POLICY FOR IMPLEMENTATION IN PUBLIC LIRAIEs 1 (2000), at http://-
vtmww.nationallawcenter.org/NLC%20Library%20Intemet%20Policy/20and%20Memo%203-15-
00.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2002) [hereinafter NLC PROPOSAL]. But the government's mere
assertion should not supersede, nor dominate, the Kreimer analysis. See PELTZ, supra note 13, at
550-53.
491. See Mainstream Loudoun 11, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
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libraries benefit from the open access policy of the ALA.492 Finally,
Mainstream Loudoun correctly discerned the library's nature, defined by
its mission, as wholly consistent with the unrestricted accumulation of
information and ideas.493 Arguably a traditional public forum, there can
be no serious contention that the nature of the library is incompatible
with the unrestrained exercise of the First Amendment right to receive.
D. Filtering as Overbroad
If the library collection, including the Internet, is a limited public
forum, then strict scrutiny applies. Mainstream Loudoun critics contend
that even in that case, filters can pass muster under strict scrutiny as a
narrowly drawn means to advance compelling state interests.4 9 4 But that
argument is frail; by the time the analysis reaches strict scrutiny, there
can be little serious contention that filtering is narrowly drawn.
The NLC flatly asserts that filters work, and any dispute about
overbreadth involves simply a choice between different brands and
features of filters of varying quality.495 According to the NLC, "there are
currently software filters on the market that can block only sites that
provide hard-core and child pornographic material." '496 The NLC goes so
far as to assert that filtering software can block content specifically
"'educationally unsuitable' or harmful to minors, or otherwise
inappropriate or unwanted." '497 The NLC trumpets these sophisticated
new filters as a vast improvement over "the first generation 'word'
filters touted to the courts in the CDA cases by the ACLU and ALA
plaintiffs as an alternative to the CDA .... 498
Unfortunately for the NLC, these sophisticated new filters do not
exist. Filter makers' assurances that their blocking decisions are based
492. See ALA, LIBRARY BILL OF RIGHTS, at http://www.ala.org/work/freedom/lbr.html (last
visited Apr. 30, 2002).
493. See Mainstream Loudoun 1, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
494. See, e.g., VanNorman, supra note 422, at 433-35. There can be little doubt that the
protection of children is a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 863
n.30 (1997). Libraries may assert other interests as well, which might or might not be
constitutionally adequate. See, e.g., NLC PROPOSAL, supra note 490, at 3-12.
495. See NLC LEGAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 19, at 53.
496. Id. (emphasis in original).
497. Id.
498. Id.; see also supra note 193.
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on only human review have proven sorely disappointing, if not plainly
false.499 If the filter does rely on a human review to establish its block
list, that list will be woefully under-inclusive."' And fine legal
definitions remain beyond filters' grasp. Even using site-blocking driven
by human review, part-time employees with no legal expertise can
hardly be expected to determine what is harmful to minors according to
the prevailing standards of an adult community °0 a thousand miles away.
More rational, if not more promising, than the NLC's groundless
confidence in filters, proponents argue that filters pass strict scrutiny
because no other means to protect children is as effective."0 2 This theory
depends on an understanding that the "narrowly drawn" prong of strict
scrutiny analysis in fact requires that there is a "less restrictive"
alternative, that is, that government has selected the least restrictive
means. 5 3 Framing strict scrutiny to require the least restrictive of
available means appears more permissive than the "narrowly drawn"
standard. The Court has used both terms in applying strict scrutiny to
public forums.5" But "less restrictive" is a comparative term, while
"narrowly drawn" hypothesizes some objective standard of
"narrowness." Looking at the words for their ordinary meanings, the
"least restrictive" mechanism need not be "narrow" at all. Indeed, had
the CDA in Reno been a grossly blunt instrument, but no less restrictive
alternatives were as effective, then exclusively "least restrictive means"
analysis -would have upheld the CDA. °50 The Court could not have
499. See supra Part ll.B.
500. SurfControl says that CyberPatrol's block list has about 100,000 sites. Jim Morrison,
Protecting Kids from Cyberwolves, FAMILY PC FROM ZDWIRE, Mar. 19, 2001, available at 2001
WL 7573047. Even assuming CyberPatrol is not at all over-inclusive, and assuming CyberPatrol can
keep its human review rate in pace vith new websites and changing web content, then one in four to
one in three pornographic websites escape CyberPatrol's reach. See NUNBERG, supra note 27, at 31.
501. The Supreme Court test for obscenity as to minors includes an inquiry into the "prevailing
standards in the adult community as a whole," Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 633 (1968),
quoted in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 895 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part), companion to the "contemporary community standards" safeguard of the adult obscenity
test, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
502. See, eg., VANNoRMAN, supra note 422, at 434-35 & n.85.
503. See id. at 434.
504. Reno, 521 U.S. at 879 (stating that with the "less restrictive" alternatives available, "the
CDA is not narrowly tailored if that requirement has any meaning at all"). To make matters more
complicated, 'narrow[] tailor[ing]" is concerned also with reviewing content-neutral restrictions in
public forums, when the state advances "significant government interest[s]" Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983).
505. Cf. VOLOKH, supra note 164, at 148-59 (criticizing the Court for hanging its hat on
alternative child protection measures "at least as effective" as the CDA).
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intended such a result." 6 The two terms therefore cannot be read to the
exclusion of each other, lest strict scrutiny be rendered impotent.
Pro-filtering enthusiasts of "least restrictive means" analysis fail when
their "proof' of no less restrictive alternatives typically consists only of
attacks on the efficacy of the alternatives.0 7 Brent VanNorman, for
example, contends that no other means to protect minors are available
because ACLU-endorsed AUPs, time limits, education programs, site
recommendations, and privacy screens are not foolproof, i.e., "do not
protect children from Internet pornography.""5 ' But even while
advocating the comparative "less restrictive" standard, VanNorman fails
to explore the over- and under-inclusiveness of filters. Thus, in his zeal
to find fault in competing alternatives, he never demonstrates how filters
can meet any fair measure of narrowness.
Nadel concedes that "even if libraries dispensed with superficial rule-
word filters, and thus avoided the silly errors they generate, the danger
of political biases from current black list filters may be too great to
permit their use.' 509 He allows time, though, for filter makers "to refine
their designs."5 '
E. Filtering as Removal, or the Myth of the Selection Paradox
If Mainstream Loudoun properly analyzed filtering under public
forum analysis, and consequently strict scrutiny, there arises as corollary
a troubling line of inquiry, about which filtering opponents make much
ado. This line of inquiry concerns whether a filter is a "selection" or a
"removal" device, or more precisely, whether there is any legitimate
distinction. From this line of inquiry, filtering opponents derive the
"selection paradox," which challenges the Mainstream Loudoun
approach in the first instance. The selection paradox arises from Pico
and Mainstream Loudoun as follows. Forum analysis, per Kreimer,
marks the library collection as a public forum for removal decisions.
According to Mainstream Loudoun, filters are removal decisions that fail
506. Cf id. at 157-59 (concluding that the Court could not have meant that the CDA may stand
if reenacted when Congress has evidence that the alternatives the Court suggested in Reno are not as
effective as the CDA).
507. See, e.g., VANNORMAN, supra note 422, at 434-35 & n.85.
508. Id.
509. NADEL, supra note 32, at 1151.
510. Id.
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strict scrutiny. But if a court can be persuaded that filtering is selection
rather than removal-a fine line, or, per now-Chief Justice Rehnquist, no
rational line at all-and that the library, for selection purposes, is a
nonpublic forum-i.e., an author has no right to expression on library
shelves-then filtering might pass muster under intermediate scrutiny, as
a reasonable means to a legitimate end. (Never mind for the moment that
filtering is an overbroad prior restraint.)
The filtering opponent might respond that the library collection is
always a public forum, for all purposes, with regard to the patrons who
receive information and ideas. But that formulation invites the
application of strict scrutiny to selection, a dangerous endeavor. Even if
one could establish that a library's physical and financial constraints
give rise to compelling state interests, it is difficult to argue that the
selection process is narrowly drawn. For example, that not all libraries
acquire non-obscene pornography, such as Playboy, exposes a flaw in
the selection process. But the filtering opponent will score few points on
the court of public opinion by arguing that libraries should carry a
representative sample of the pornographic genre.
Thus the filtering opponent is pressed into a comer: compelled to
concede that selection occurs in a nonpublic forum, so that the status quo
of book selection can be preserved; and pressed to argue for a selection-
removal distinction that is technologically equivocal and that the current
Chief Justice has refused to perceive.
This "selection paradox" is represented graphically in the following
chart.
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Chart
MAINSTREAM LOUDOUN/CIPA DECISION TREE
AND THE SELECTION PARADOX
[aii7sr: Pico removal? -I or selection? or outside Pico?
E oniii -nalysis- < default, or outside Pico? I
li6ited7 'blic forum I if not Pico, then ...?j
inu p~bic foru
selection paradox.
rerovalP. election?
strict serdtiny
rters fi I status quofails? can't be! try nonpublc.1
nonpublic forum?
kemoval? or selection?
intermediate scrutiny
'Q/t p4,
ijlters pass? or status quo passe
The Chart illustrates how a "selection" determination-whether as a
precursor to or as a part of forum analysis, and including a determination
that there is no rational distinction between selection and removal-not
only takes the analysis "outside Pico," but also takes the analysis outside
Mainstream Loudoun. Outside Mainstream Loudoun, there are two
possibilities: the nonpublic forum inquiry of forum analysis, which
conflicts with the forum determination guided by Kreimer; or some other
approach outside forum analysis.
In truth, neither of those possibilities pertains because the selection
paradox is a fiction. It is a fiction because there is a legitimate
distinction between selection and removal, and filtering can be properly
characterized only as removal.
When Judge Brinkema described filtering as removal rather than
selection, it seems at first blush that she applied a hopelessly outmoded
t
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distinction to a distinctively modem problem. Marshall McLuhan might
have charged her with "look[ing] at the present through a rear-view
mirror," or "liv[ing] imaginatively in Bonanza-land."' 1' McLuhan
condemned "the application of outdated critical concepts based on a
misguided application of the values of a print-based culture to the
products of the electronic age."5 2 Removal provided Judge Brinkema
with a convenient and known analytical framework: Pico, handily
retrofit with public forum analysis. She did not then have to decide what
analysis pertains "outside Pico," or deal with the impact of forum
analysis on the selection process.
But to charge Judge Brinkema with a decision of convenience is to
give her too little credit. In fact, the distinction-some distinction-
makes sense, even if the words "selection" and "removal" are
outmoded."' Justice Brennan's opinion itself in Pico gives little
indication why he drew a distinction between selection and removal,
focusing instead on removal as "the danger of an official suppression of
ideas," '514 but he was probably cognizant of the evidentiary problem
inherent in second-guessing librarians' countless selection decisions.
Concurring, Justice Blackmun expressed "some doubt" about the
"theoretical distinction" between selection and removal, but then he
quoted with approval Judge Newman, writing in concurrence with the
affirmed Second Circuit decision in Pico, that
there is a profound practical and evidentiary distinction between
the two actions: "removal, more than failure to acquire, is likely to
suggest that an impermissible political motivation may be present.
There are many reasons why a book is not acquired, the most
obvious being limited resources, but there are few legitimate
reasons why a book, once acquired, should be removed from a
library not filled to capacity."
' s
511. MARSHALL MCLUHAN & QUENTIN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE 75 (1967).
512. See CHRIS GREGORY, STAR TREK: PARALLEL NARRATIVES 5 (2000).
513. Inspiring my conclusion here, my colleague Professor John DiPippa teaches that even while
we recognize that a historical model in the law has become merely a metaphor in light of new,
technology-driven problems, we need not necessarily discard the old. Rather, we test and tinker with
the metaphor, and by that process develop nev models that work.
514. See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 862, 871-72
(1982).
515. Id. at 878 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Bd. ofEduc. v. Pico, 638 F.2d 404, 436
(2d Cir. 1980) (Nevnan, J., concurring)).
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Indeed, scholars subsequently recognized this evidentiary problem as
the basis of the distinction." 6 The law would have difficulty getting a
grip on library selection, which editor and publisher Eric Moon
described in 1969 as "like trying to lasso an eel." '517 Nadel suggested in
2000 that library selection is "comparable to the making of laws and
sausages, '51 meaning that society, content with the tasty result, has
looked the other way while librarians made unpalatable content-based,
even viewpoint-based, selection decisions.519 Nadel suggests that within
the framework of a nonpublic forum analysis, evidentiary standards
might be developed to allow legal challenges to selections. 2
Evidentiary feasibility justifies Judge Brinkema's selection-removal
distincion, because filtering criteria or blocking lists are producible and
thus may be subject to judicial scrutiny. But the evidentiary problem is
not the sole sensible reason for a selection-removal distinction. Rather,
selection and removal are fundamentally different functions.
Nadel champions Finley as the proper analog to analyze filtering in
the library. Indeed, the analog is appealing. Finley involved the
inherently content-based process by which the National Endowment for
the Arts awards grants to support artistic work.521' The NEA's invariably
subjective criteria include:
"technical proficiency of the artist, the creativity of the work, the
anticipated public interest in or appreciation of the work, the
516. See, e.g., Joy Koletsky, Note, First Amendment-Free Speech: Right To Know-Limit of
School Board's Discretion in Curricular Choice-Public School Library as Marketplace of Ideas,
27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1034, 1049 (1977) ("The only apparent distinction between a case
involving selection of books and one involving removal is an evidentiary problem in the former."),
cited in Gordon Danning, Freedom of Speech in Public Schools: Using Communication Analysis to
Eliminate the Role of Educational Ideology, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 123, 153 n.137 (1991).
517. Eric Moon, Introduction, in BOOK SELECTION AND CENSORSHIP IN THE SIXTIES 4 (Eric
Moon ed., 1969).
518. NADEL, supra note 32, at 1139 n.104. Eels, it turns out, are "particularly fond" of sausage.
Coarse Angling in Australia, Eels, previously at http://members.ozemail.com.au/-waldocklEels.
html (last visited Mar. 6, 2001).
519. See LEROY CHARLES MERRITT, BOOK SELECTION AND INTELLECrUAL FREEDOM 12-13
(1970) ("That some librarians consciously or unconsciously do engage in censorship in the selection
process is an unfortunate irrelevancy."); see also supra note 373 and accompanying text. Rose Mary
Magrill and John Corbin described the library patron's "'black box' mentality: it does not matter to
the library's clientele what goes on behind the scenes, so long as the needed material or information
is available when required." MAGRILL & CORBIN, supra note 334, at vii.
520. See supra notes 372-75 and accompanying text.
521. NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585 (1998) (discussing "the nature of arts funding").
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work's contemporary relevance, its educational value, its suitability
for or appeal to special audiences (such as children or the
disabled), its service to a rural or isolated community, or even
simply that the work could increase public knowledge of an art
form."
5 2
Moreover, the Court in Finley approved as viewpoint neutral the
additional criteria, "general standards of decency and respect for the
diverse beliefs and values of the American public."' "n The NEA selection
criteria bear a striking resemblance to the invariably content-based
library selection criteria. For example, the Boulder, Colorado, selection
policy lists criteria including "[1]iterary and artistic merit,"
"[a]ppropriateness and effectiveness of medium to content,"
"[p]ositive ... review[s]," "[p]opularity with library patrons,"
"[i]mportance as a document of the times," "[p]resent and potential
relevance to community needs," and "[s]uitability of subject, style and
reading level for the intended audience. 524
In Finley, the Court checked only for viewpoint neutrality in the NEA
process, and from there arises Nadel's suggestion for similarly lenient
scrutiny of filtering in the public library."2 The Court focused on the risk
of "suppress[ing]... dangerous ideas, 526 as in Pico. But Finley is
properly analogized only to library selection, indeed, only to library
book selection. The Court recognized that NEA selectivity was driven by
"limited resources," requiring that "the majority of the grant
applications" NEA receives be denied even if they bear artistic merit.5 27
Similarly, library selection is driven by limited budgets, and librarians
522. Id. (quoting Petitioner's brief).
523. Id. at 576 (quoting 20 U.S.C.A. § 954(d)(1)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
524. BOULDER PUBLIC LIBRARY, MATERIALS SELECTION POLICY, at http'//www.boulder.lib.co.
us! generallselection.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2002). There is a difference of opinion regarding the
treatment of sexual content in a selection policy. Compare MERRrIT, supra note 519, at 14 ("An
actual or theoretical obscenity quotient is not a criterion of selection."), with Stuart C. Sherman,
Librarian Providence Public Library, Providence, R.I., Public Library, in BOOK SELECTION AND
CENsORsHIP IN THE SIXTIES, supra note 517, at 16 (equating "pornography" with 'libel" and
"treason," excluded from selection).
525. See NADEL, supra note 32, at 1141.
526. Finley, 524 U.S. at 587 (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S.
540, 550 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
527. Id. at 585.
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cannot purchase the majority of books in print. But financial constraints
do not ordinarily necessitate removal of a book already on the shelf.
2
Using conventional understandings of the words "selection" and
"removal," one can rationally argue that filtering, as a technological
process, fits either definition. In every instance in which a patron
requests a web page from the Internet, the filter may be analogized to a
content selector that checks the web page for compliance with selection
criteria before producing the content for the patron. Or under Judge
Brinkema's reasoning, the filter may be perceived as affinmatively
rejecting content that the library has already acquired in a one-time
expenditure to open an Internet portal."'
But arguments founded on the conventional definitions of the two
words are misplaced. The pertinent inquiry to determine whether a
content-based process should be subject to the usual strict scrutiny or
granted a Finley "pass" is whether the process "threatens to suppress the
expression of particular ideas or viewpoints."53 In Finley, reasonable
minds on the Court differed as to whether such a threat was posed by the
statutory "decency" standard in the NEA funding scheme,53" ' though no
Justice posited that the funding scheme sans decency requirement posed
a threat. For the NEA's usual selection process, the content-based,
subjective inquiries are necessitated by financial constraints-the
traditional, peculiar "nature of arts funding"532 -circumstances that
dictate a "pass" on strict scrutiny. Likewise, content-based, subjective
inquiries, necessitated by financial constraints, describe what may be
termed as the traditional, peculiar "nature of library selection" and weigh
in favor of a "pass" on strict scrutiny for the usual library selection
process.
The same- is not true for filtering. To determine whether filtering
should be subject to the usual strict scrutiny or granted a Finley "pass,"
the pertinent inquiry is again whether filtering threatens to suppress the
528. See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., concurring), cited in Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudon County Library,
2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 793 (E.D. Va. 1998) (Mainstream Loudoun 1). Routine "weeding" of the
collection is, of course, a separate matter. See generally, e.g., MAGRILL & CORBIN, supra note 334,
at 248-50.
529. See Mainstream Loudoun 1, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 793-94.
530. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439,447 (1991), quoted in Finley, 524 U.S. at 587.
531. Compare Finley, 524 U.S. at 587, with id. at 600-01 (Souter, J., dissenting).
532. Id. at 585.
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expression of particular ideas or viewpoints. Ample evidence suggests
that it is.533 But even absent concrete examples, Finley suggests inquiring
into whether the filtering process is necessarily content-based because of
resource constraints, that is, as a function of the peculiar nature of
library selection. In this sense, filtering and the ordinary selection
process differ. Resource constraints do not demand that filters operate on
a content basis, nor even that filters operate at all. That filters are in
place and make content-based "decisions" despite the lack of any
resource limitation poses a sufficient threat of viewpoint suppression to
deny a Finley "pass" and boot filters back into ordinary forum analysis.
Thus, to return to and dispel the myth of the selection paradox,
Mainstream Loudoun proves correct after all. The filtering opponent errs
in conceding that filtering can be construed as selection. That the words
"selection" and "removal" no longer have relevance in the context of
modem technology is an alluring but not altogether true proposition. The
rationale underlying the distinction still pertains, regardless of what
words are used. Even superimposition of public forum analysis does not
necessitate Justice Rehnquist's rejection of a selection-removal
distinction. Libraries may well be public forums, wherein a Finley
"pass" mitigates strict scrutiny specially with regard to the selection
process.534 Extending Justice Rehnquist's Pico conflation of selection
and removal imprudently allows the government a discretion in both
cases that is justified only in the rare situation when the peculiarly
content-dependent nature of an activity demands an analysis more
lenient than usual.
F. Filtering as Prior Restraint
Mainstream Loudoun ruled that filtering is an impermissible prior
restraint because of (1) the libraries' delegation of blocking
determinations to a private vendor with secret criteria; (2) the chilling
effect created by the unblocking procedure; and (3) and the lack of
procedural safeguards, such as expeditious judicial review, in the
533. See supra part H.B.
534. Thus the library need not purchase Playboy. Gifts, including books or a gift subscription to
Playboy, would still trigger the Finley pass, as the library must invest in cataloging, maintaining,
displaying, and storing donated publications. Cf. Via v. City of Richmond, 543 F. Supp. 382, 383-
84 (E.D. Va. 1982) (on procedural grounds, allowing public library to refuse gift subscription to
atheist magazine that library judged of poor quality and limited patron appeal).
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unblocking process." 5 The latter ground garners little criticism,
presumably because a library may modify its procedural safeguards to
allay the court's concerns and continue filtering. But filtering proponents
otherwise charge that the Mainstream Loudoun court erred.
The NLC tries to side-step the problems of delegation and secret
criteria by shifting the level of abstraction. In the NLC view, libraries
and schools are not delegating a public function to private companies
with secret criteria, because the libraries and schools make a choice as to
which company will filter and instruct the company as to the nature of
content to be filtered. The meat of the decision-making process is in
deciding which filtering product to use, say CyberPatrol, and what
category restriction to choose, say "full nudity." But that position thinly
veils unconstitutional delegation. The Mainstream Loudoun court
correctly understood that the decision maker is the entity in contact with
the content under review-the filtering company. Imagine if the National
Park Service were to assign the management of Lafayette Park in
Washington, D.C., to a private agent, selected and instructed to "manage
the park for lawful purposes." The private agent could not advance a
partisan agenda free from judicial scrutiny. A public entity cannot
immunize a process against judicial review simply by stating a
constitutional objective, then wholly surrendering to private hands broad
authority to attain that objective by unlawful means.
In a further effort to justify filtering, the NLC asserts, first, that a
library can disable a filter "for research or special projects or [to] allow a
parent to broaden a minor's permissible reach," and second, that filtered
access is analogous to restricted access to special collections."' These
points aim to dispel the contention that unblocking imposes an
impermissible chilling effect. With regard to "research" disabling, the
NLC might argue that the option alleviates patrons' fears that they will
have to seek special permission to access a blocked website. With regard
to special collections, the NLC might argue that no chilling effect occurs
there, or that any chilling effect is outweighed by a greater good, when
patients must seek special permission to access a part of the collection,
so the same should hold true for blocked Internet content.
535. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 569-
70 & n.22 (E.D. Va. 1998) (Mainstream Loundoun fl).
536. NLC LEGAL MEMORANDUM, supra note 19, at 55.
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Disabling provisions at first blush offer an appealing "way out," but
constitutional problems still lurk. The NLC does not address the
arbitrariness intrinsic to disabling decisions.537 It would be prohibitively
difficult to draft a disabling policy to define "research" in a content-
neutral fashion, and any content-based definition invites government to
make the slippery sort of decisions the First Amendment disfavors. For
example, no meaningful definition of research could approve an artist
researching vulgarity in art before and since Robert Maplethorpe yet
disapprove of the same artist conducting the same search with prurient
intent-unless a librarian can be expected to judge the patron's intent.
The NLC is unconcerned by the troublesome notion that librarians
would pass judgment over which patron requests are worthy of the
"research" designation that merits unfiltered access. Meanwhile the
ordinary patron might not even get as far as the reference desk;
Mainstream Loudoun recognized a chilling effect when a patron must
request access to a single site on, say, sexual dysfunction. That chilling
effect is in no way diminished when a patron must request unfiltered
access to research sexual dysfunction as a topic.
The NLC analogy to special collections also seems appealing but
crumbles on closer inspection. Special collections are restricted to
preserve materials that are extremely rare or unusually fragile,
characteristics related to, but not co-extensive with, content. Filters
operate to ban materials based on a content analysis. A fragile item in
special collections may be protected by reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions that are not based on "content." Arguably, rarity is a
content-based determination, in which case narrowly drawn special
collection restrictions may be justified under strict scrutiny. But the
question is one of abstraction; arguably, a characteristic such as
uniqueness is not content-based, because a historic issue of Playboy
merits preservation as a rare piece of Americana as much as a first
edition of Huckleberry Finn. Either way, the content-based/content-
neutral distinction, exclusive of viewpoint, operates specifically to
impede government from relying on "'constitutionally disfavored
justifications,' (e.g., paternalism or curbing offensiveness)" for
"restricting speech because [of] its communicative impact."538 Those
justifications do not motivate government in special collections, which
537. Of course, the e-rate provisions in CIPA do not even allow disabling for minors. See supra
notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
538. BARRON & DIEwu, supra note 432, at 34 (quoting Geoffrey R- Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. CH. L REV. 46 (1987)).
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exist to enhance and preserve public access. Filters, however, repudiate
public access for the very reason of offensiveness, giving the public
legitimate cause to scrutinize their content-based vagaries.
Nadel insists that libraries must have procedurally adequate
mechanisms to correct filters' tendency to discriminate based on
viewpoint,539 but he does not address the possibility that procedural
safeguards might not cure the chilling effect in requiring patrons
affirmatively to seek access to improperly blocked content, even
anonymously. Interestingly, he suggests that libraries can avoid being
overwhelmed by "thousands of unblocking requests-particularly if civil
libertarian groups, like Peacefire.org, catalogued flaws in each brand of
filter"-by pooling resources or recruiting patron volunteers to review
the requests. 40 One is left to wonder why "thousands of unblocking
requests" do not demonstrate filters' very inadequacy.
V. CONCLUSION
Internet filtering is demonstrably inefficacious. It is at once grossly
over-inclusive and under-inclusive. Blocking decisions are typically
invulnerable to public inspection, based on proprietary criteria in the
hands of profit-oriented businesses prone to ideological biases. Despite
these limitations, Congress, in its third attempt to regulate Internet
content in the name of child protection, has mandated filtering for public
library patrons, on libraries' pain of losing federal financial support. The
only federal court to consider the constitutionality of a library system's
mandatory filtering policy decided that it violated patrons' First
Amendment rights. That decision has come under intense criticism from
filtering proponents, but the court's reasoning withstands scrutiny and
should compel the same result in the case of CIPA, the federal statute.
Filtering triggers public-forum analysis. The library is a limited public
forum, and filtering, an inherently overbroad mechanism, cannot survive
the "narrowly drawn" inquiry of strict scrutiny. Contrary to filtering
proponents' contentions, filtering is properly classified as a removal
process rather than a selection process, and library selection policies
may justifiably be exempted from strict scrutiny. In any event, filtering
539. NADEL, supra note 32, at 1153-54.
540. Id. at 1154.
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and discretionary unblocking procedures violate the First Amendment as
a prior restraint on the right to receive constitutionally protected content.
"[P]emicious idea[s]" might indeed have "incited the degradations of
slavery and the genocidal slaughter of the Holocaust." '41 But by denying
government the power to proscribe the transmission of ideas for reason
of their perceived perniciousness, the First Amendment "empowers and
compels people to pursue their own destiny." '42 Library patrons can learn
to make their own mature decisions about the value of information and
ideas. This learning defines the mission of the public library, a hallowed
place to all who share in the American experience. The lessons learned
there should not be forcibly distorted by virtue of government
ownership. Rather patrons of the public library should be compelled
only to use the filters they were born with.
541. Microsystems Software, Inc. v. Scandinavia Online AB, 98 F. Supp. 2d 74, 74 (D. Mass.
2000).
542. Tony Pedersen, President, Inter-American Press Association (2000), in FREEDOM FORUM,
2001 FPsTAMENnMENrCALENDAR JULY 18 (2001).
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